Saudi limbo and the future of the Levant
Recent developments in the Middle East have
been playing out like an accelerated cartoon scene since the alleged August 21
chemical attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta. Within two months,
the Syrian regime went from a pariah to a partner of the international
community in chemical weapons disarmament while its detratctor, Saudi Arabia,
went from a newly appointed patron of the anti-Assad coalition to total
isolation, having failed to dictate its regional agenda on Obama and the United
States. To add insult to injury,
the US showed overture toward Iran’s willigness to reach an agreement on its
nuclear program with a historic phone call from Obama to Iran’s president , and
a meeting agenda to discuss the Iranain proposal at the level of foreign
ministers.
In the wake of these events, Saudi Arabia
reacted strongly by successively excusing itself from speaking before the
league of nations and then refusing a 2-year rotating seat at the United
Nations Security Council, while its foe, Syrian president Bashar el-Assad, was
appearing daily on major news channels worldwide.
It is during one of these appearances, on the
Arabic channel Al Mayadeen on October 21, 2013, two months after the alleged
chemical attacks, that Assad spelled out Saudi policy in Syria as one which
executes Washington’s orders. Assad
could not ignore the recent divergence between Saudis and the US on Syria
because while the US took a clear step back by agreeing on the Russian promoted
UN resolution to halt threat of bombing in exchange for Syria’s destruction of
its chemical arsenal, Saudis were not only voicing frustration, but threatening
to go it alone on Syria. Why then
did Assad treat Saudi Policy in Syria as a mere execution of US orders? A simple explanation could be that the
interview being in Arabic, Assad was addressing an Arab audience - including
Saudis - that could view the US
link as damaging to Saudis authorities.
A recent poll indicated decline for support to Saudi policies in the
Arab world where Saudis have historically intervened. Given Arabs historical suspicion of the US, making this link
does not help Saudi image among Arab citizens. Another explanation could be that Assad was specifically
addressing Saudi paid foreign fighters in Syria telling them that they are
fighting for a US led agenda. This
potentially can increase suspicions and infighting, which are rife among rebels
in Syria. A third explanation
could be that Assad was sending a signal to Saudis that obeying US has not done
them any good and that should Iran repare its relations with the US, all is not
lost for a Saudi come back in the Levant.
This is because Saudi power is not monolithic and it hasn’t always been
as close to US policies when it comes to the Levant. One should only remember how Saudis supported a Syrian led
solution in Lebanon after the civil war, through the Taef agreements, and probably
convinced their US ally of this, while Syria was not exactly the kind of
country that the US considered friendly, even at the time.
The Saudi sphere of influence can be divided
in different and competing zones when it comes to their narrow interests in the
region. There is the Gulf pole that
is often mentioned, Egypt, which has been a traditional ally except for the
brief Muslim Brotherhood presidency, and the Levant. These different and competing zones have collapsed into one when
Saudis started pursuing a strong and narrow sectarian agenda after the Iraq
war. But the Levant, and to a
certain extent, Iraq, have been resisting such an agenda. Lebanon, despite 15 years of civil war
which saw the collapse of the state, complicated agreements entrenching sectarian
politics after the end of the civil war, and the danger zone in which the
country found itself recently with the Syria crisis, is still miraculously
holding against the spectre of a full fledged sectarian war. Moreover, the divisions among Lebanese Christians
have complicated the Saudi sectarian equation for the country, giving an edge
to Shias, rather then Sunnis. In Syria,
where the sectarian agenda is the most forcefully enforced through hordes of foreign
fighters, a central state, army, and other institutions, as well as a pro-Assad
population hailing from all sects, wary of the sectarian agenda, have all
contributed to keep the country together, after nearly three years of war.
The resistance to the sectarian Saudi agenda
in the Levant might soon force a
change of heart among Saudi rulers because if the agenda fails - and there are
indications it will fail - it will be the end of Saudi influence in the region. It will also, in return, represent a
threat to Saudi rulers from disenfranchised and bitter jihadis. This is what
Iran’s foreign minister meant when he, in his first televised interview with
Press TV, without naming Saudis, warned that extremism might end up knocking at
the door of those who nurture it.
Having put all its eggs in the same basket by
pursuing an agenda linking all its interests and spheres of influence in one
political sectarian gamble, Saudi Arabia finds itself today near defeat, thanks
mainly to Syria’s resilience and to Iran’s new leadership willingness to end
its isolation. The only event that
may reverse defeat is a change of guard in the Saudi internal power scene, as
it happened in Qatar, a retreat to a more pragmatic, less suicidal, foreign
policy. While this is unlikely to
happen soon, given the structure of this absolute monarchy, it is still a
possibility that a rapidly changing political scene will bring in its wake
crises and unexpected developments.
A recent pro-Saudi op-ed in the Washington Post is a signal of things to
come. Saudi doctrine will change,
we are told, from being protected to protecting itself. Clearly, all the US has to offer is
protection in the form of military bases and this protection will not go away
because it is tied to US interests.
But what protecting itself
means for Saudi Arabia ? It
means developing, for the first time, the means for a foreign policy
independant from the US. This
independance will not happen in the Gulf where peace between Iran and the US
and Gulf kingdoms’ rivalries will severely restrict Saudi role. Any independance for Saudis from US
foreign policy will come from their role in Egypt and the Levant where Saudis
still command great influence among local politicians, where Israel is commonly
loathed and where the Resistance is part of the culture of every citizen. This is why Saudis mentioned Palestine
as an example of a dysfunctional UN.
If Saudis really feel that decades of following US orders have brought them nothing in matters of
influence on the wider Middle East agenda, they may still reverse course on
their sectarian agenda and focus instead on supporting the Resistance as a way
of regaining initiative and influence in the region, if only they were thinking
strategically, and not merely reacting to their misfortunes. This can potentially have a positive
effect on Saudi internal Shia turmoil.
As unlikely as it may appear, this scenario is plausible especially with
an Iran turned inward to develop its economy after years of sanctions and an
Iranian political class preoccupied mainly by its survival, not by regional
hegemony even if this desire and their patronage of the Resistance have served
them well in the past. Saudi
support for the Resistance can come in many ways, one of them could be through
Lebanese internal politics where they can immediately support a consensus
government and stop blocking Hezbollah from playing the political role the
Lebanese want it to play.
But for this to happen, a tectonic shift is needed in Saudi internal
politics. One wonders if the US,
confident of Saudi subservience, will permit this shift. In Georges Clooney’s Syriana, a heir to
the Saudi throne is eliminated by the US
because of its independance.
That’s the historic conundrum in which many US client countries find
themselves in, unable to reform and change course. Saudi Arabia is a perfect example of acute US dependance.
Assad’s allusion that Saudis were following US
orders in their Syrian agenda might have been a challenge to Saudis to build
their own. It is clearly a phase
of great instability in the region and as each country will have to redefine
its priorities, the Resistance in Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon will
have to redefine its priorities and external as well as internal alliances. Some will endure and some will
change. And unless there is a just
peace in Palestine and between Israel and the Arab countries that border it, the Levant will stay the playground for
those who seek influence either by challenging the Resistance or by supporting
it, without ever being able to get rid of it. This is the choice facing Saudis today. Their diminishing inlfuence to shape events
in the Gulf will force them to count on the Levant where they can either
continue to challenge the Resistance on its turf and face total defeat or
change course and gain some leverage[1]
and independance. But one thing is
sure, nobody can dictate its agenda for the long term on the Resistance because
it is not only a military, but a cultural phenomenon, born out of injustice,
much like the Occupy movements. The arc of History in the ME is bending away from Israel, thanks to the axis of Resistance. Saudis should seize the occasion, reconcile with the idea of an Iranian leadership in the region, and join the resistance!
[1] In the beginning of the twentieth century, after the Hashemite Hijazi branch of Saudis were driven out
from power by Al-Saud, they established kingdoms in Iraq and the Levant.
Since March 29th 2006
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