Showing posts with label Shi'a. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shi'a. Show all posts

16.4.12

'In The Shadow Of Sectarianism': When US scholars produce a posteriori justifications for their country’s foreign policy


Sectarianism: a basic definition is ‘Being ideologically in the confines of one’s own sect’

This is a comment on an interview with MaxWeiss published on Jadaliyya around his book ‘In the shadow of sectarianism’.  It is not a comment on his book of the same title. 

Weiss : 
« I suppose the central question at the heart of my book is: How did the Lebanese Shi`a become sectarian? »
The hypothesis, as it is stated, rests on one of these two assumptions :
1)   Lebanese were sectarians and Shi'a were not but became sectarians later.
2)   None of the Lebanese communities became sectarians, only Shi'a did. 
From a methodological perspective, this is a question that already contain an answer which validates the hypothesis that Shi'a sectarianism is to be treated separately from others.

But because it is impossible to treat the question of Shi'a sectarianism separately from others, Weiss is forced to formulate a secondary hypothesis which appears as an ad hoc hypothesis by stating that his study of Shi'a sectarianism is a case study in sectarianism.  This secondary ad hoc hypothesis is acceptable in itself but doesn’t fit well with the main hypothesis as it is stated.
« Therefore, I concluded that there was some value in considering the institutionalization of sectarianism and Shi`ism together, as part of what might be called a sort of case study in the critical historical analysis of Lebanese sectarianism. »
Weiss couldn’t decide if his book is the study of Shi’a sectarianism as a case study of sectarianism in Lebanon or a study of Shi’a sectariansim without reference to other communities. In other words he is methodologically engaged, by definition, in studying sectarianism from a Shi'a sectarian perspective, within the confines of one sect.

The focal point of the book, Weiss says, is:
« that the Shi`i community in Lebanon became sectarian—which for me also meant starting to practice being sectarian—during the period of French Mandate rule (1918-1943) »
This was the period of the institutionnalisation of sectarianism in the Middle East for all sects under the French and the English mandates which took territories from the defeated Ottoman empire as ‘sacred trusts’ and transformed them into countries. One Wonder what’s in the Shi’a sectarianism for Weiss?

Weiss is interested in Shi’a sectarianism as sectarianism with regard to Sunnis, and not to other sects  in Lebanon, something that he doesn’t state openly in his interview but that is illustrated with a picture showing religious dignitaries from both sects. Weiss situates the rise of Shi’a sectarianism around the French mandate but does not attribute it to the French mandate.  Under the French mandate Shi’a assumed a more independant and visible role than during the Ottoman empire when they were persecuted, forced to convert, and displaced.  Normally, this is where one should search for the roots of Shi’a sectarianism.  Maybe Weiss does tackle the question in his book.  But I found it strange that there is not one occurrence for the word Sunni in Weiss’s interview in Jadaliyya.  I bet also that there is very little in his book.  
Ottoman rule was caracterised by religious tolerance but certainely not at the end when European countries started waging a war on the empire at its confines by heightening sectarian tensions.  Was the persecution of Shi’a the result of this process? 

Based on his argument that Shi’a sectarianism developed under the French mandate but was not the result of the French mandate, Weiss argues that there is ‘sectarianisation from below’ initiated by the community, as opposed to ‘sectarianisation from above’ imposed by rulers.  But by situating the start of Shi’a sectarianism with the French mandate, he completely obliterates the fact that  what he calls ‘sectarianism from below’ was provoked by persecutions before the French mandate which might be considered, in fact, as a sectariansim 'from above'.  And while he absolves the French from being at the origins of Shi'a sectarianism we don't know if he does the same for other sects.  It is notorious that the French are behind the structuring of the political system in Lebanon in a sectarian one and have played a role in the sectarianisation of the Shi'a 'from above' by instituting privileges for other sects.

But opening the question of Shi'a sectarianism to the Ottoman period and to sectarianism among other sects under the French rule might weaken Weiss's argument for a 'sectarianism from below'

What interests Weiss is modern history of Shi’a in Lebanon and ‘Alawi in Syria (on whish he is writing a book), in other words, the  Gordian knot of the ‘Shi’a crescent’ 
« By the time that Imam Musa al-Sadr arrived on the Lebanese scene in the late 1950s, therefore, a foundation for the mobilization of a specifically Shi`i politics was well in place. »

This is why he states that sectarianism, particularly in this case, is:
« built upon and shored up by certain institutions and practices, which might include parochial schools, the allocation of political positions according to sectarian metrics, the primacy afforded to communal law courts over and above other jurisdictions, and a deeply divided media environment » 
But when Musa al-Sadr arrives on the 'Lebanese scene' there are no strong institutions for Shi'a or deeply divided media environement between Shi'a and Sunnis.  At the time Shi'a called themselves Al-Mahroumin (The Deprived).  Shi’a were battered by a border war between  Israel and the Palestinians, forced to move again by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and left deprived by the state.  Here again, Weiss overlooks the persecution and deprivation factors in the construction of sectarianism,  and to take into account these two factors is to render the distinction between ‘sectarianism from above’ and ‘sectarianism from below’ totally useless because persecutions and deprivations come from above.

And while arguing that sectarianism could be ‘modified or undone’ he admits that once enshrined in institutions,
« It will be difficult, if not impossible, to combat or even defeat sectarianism in all its forms without clear-eyed attention to the array of institutional venues in which sectarianism has been and continues to be produced, nurtured, and sustained. »
And here he warns about Iraq.  
It is ironic that at the end of the interview in which he lays out his argument about Shi’a sectarianism, Weiss warns about Iraq.  Ironic because if there is a case for Shi’a secatarianism continually and exclusively nurtured from above, either through the English mandate, persecutions or, as of 2003, by an imposed ‘democracy’ without civil institutions (or sectarianism from below), it can be found in Iraq.   In fact Iraq might well be a perfect example of how Europe and the West played the sectarian game to finish off the Ottoman empire and how they continue to play it until today to further divide the remnants of this empire.  In the Middle East, it's been sectarianism 'from above' all the way from the fall of the Ottoman empire to the 'Arab Spring'.
By arguing for a sectarianism 'from below’ Weiss is doing nothing more than an a posteriori justification to the current western game of sectarianism in the Middle East and his hypothesis is no more then a fallacy containing its own confirmation leaving out the main factors in the radicalisation of identities around communities and sects; persecutions, deprivations and fear.  The same is true of excessive privileges.  Where Shi'a sectarianism have been provoked by persecutions, other sectarianisms were provoked by excessive privileges given from above. Sectarianism cannot be treated as a phenomenon of one sect only, it plants its roots wherever there is deep inequality elevating barriers between self and other and between communities.

Update:  I found this review of Weiss's book by Alexander Henley There are at least two other reviews of this book and I will try to make them available on this post soon.
P.S.  Upon reading the interview, I was angry that not only Jadaliyya published an interview on a book that is a propaganda for US foreign policy among scholars and university students promoting sectarianism as part of who we are, but that they didn't bother asking the author questions that should have been asked.  Weiss seems also incapable of speaking about the Middle East without the lens and language of sectarianism.

11.4.07

The Hezbollah between USraeli sponsored anti-guerilla and national and regional dialogues

The political situation in Lebanon is in a dead end. The Sanyura government supported by the Bush administration is refusing any internal dialogue with its opponents, which are a majority in Lebanon and include Hezbollah, Amal and the Free patriotic movement. Arguing that Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation holding allegiances to Iran and Syria, the Bush administration has undermined any solution to the Lebanese dead end and is actively promoting confrontation by literally arming the anti-Hezbollah Samir Gea'gea's militia, the security apparatus of Sanyura's puppet government, which doubled in a matter of months reaching 24000 men, and by tolerating the activity of openly islamist sunni extremist organisations in Lebanon. The last bombing of two passengers buses in the Lebanese mountain at 'Ayn 'Alaq had the signature of sunni extremists. Read the April report of the International Crisis Group, page 11.
The opposition to the Sanyura government has entered its fifth month of standoff with no solution in sight despite some attempts (not genuine in my opinion) from the Saudis to come up with a proposal. Initially, the opposition has asked for an extension of the Sanyura government into a national unity government to include ministers from the Christian Free Patriotic Movement. As their pacifist demand was ignored, they have now one outcome, the ballot box. But even here, the Sanyura government seems to be reluctant to agree on early elections and is afraid of losing its grip on power.

It is in this tense climate that Hassan Nasrallah gave Alain Gresh the following interview translated by the author of this blog.

Meeting and interviewing Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the most important party in Lebanon, is not an easy task. Even though Hezbollah is a parliamentary party with a large social infrastructure and a preponderant influence among Shiites, it is classified as a terrorist organisation by the US. Hassan Nasrallah is, without a doubt, un « homme à abattre », a man on the killing list.

The interview is meant for TV and is a part of a TV documentary on Hezbollah. We are told that the meeting will take place in the afternoon and that someone will meet us at a restaurant and drive us to the meeting venue without any other precision as to the time of the meeting. A first car drives us into a garage where we are transferred into a second car with blackened windows: we cannot identify the trajectory. We will be transferred five times from one car to another before we reach our destination: an improvised studio with two flags, the Lebanese and Hezbollah's.

Despite all these precautions, the man who comes to meet us does not appear anxious. He speaks slowly, smile often and tries to convince without ever raising the tone of the conversation. The interview lasts 2 hours. Here are some themes tackled in the interview. There are no transcripts yet of the recordings and the quotes are taken from personal notes. Questions are in Italic Bold.

The internal situation in Lebanon.
The risks for a renewal of the civil war exist, however Hezbollah will do everything in its power to avoid it. The majority of the Lebanese people, who have already experienced a civil war, do not want another one. Our objective for Lebanon is not an Islamic republic for to be implemented the Islamic republic will require the consent of the majority of the population. That is not the case in Lebanon: not only the Christian minority refuse to live in an Islamic republic but even Lebanese Muslims are not convinced by such a project. We want a Lebanon whose destiny is not decided by one religion but by all its religious communities. It is for this same reason that we asked for a national unity government. The Imam Moussa Sadr was the first to advocate an end to sectarianism in Lebanon; but we have to take into account the realities and fears of Lebanese, those among Christians who are afraid from becoming marginalised.

Why doesn't Hezbollah give its weapons in a sign of good will destined to the other communities?
Our weapons are not directed at other communities in Lebanon neither are they for at internal combat operations. They were never used as such. Our weapons are destined to Israel and the resistance against the external enemy, Israel and Israeli aggression and occupation.

The velayat e-faqih [1] and relations with Iran. Is there a contradiction between the fidelity to the religious principle of velayat e-faqih and the fact that Hezbollah is a national Lebanese political party ?
No. On one hand, all what we do we do it to serve our country Lebanon. We even make use of our relations with Iran in the service of our country, never the contrary. We define our Politic and our strategy according to our priorities. On the other hand, the velayat e-faqih is an allegiance to a man and not a country. The Velayat e-faqih is actually Iranian, before he was Iraqi, and in the future he will probably be Lebanese. Iran is a state and it designs its strategy and obligations accordingly. These strategy and obligations are not ours. For example, Iran has diplomatic relations with Lybia but we don't. We are hostiles to such relations as long as Lybia does not explain the disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr (Sadr is the founding Shi'ite Imam of the political movement 'Al-Mahroumin', the dispossessed, the precursor movement to present Shi'ite political parties, Amal and Hezbollah. He disappeared in Lybia in suspicious circumstances in 1978 and his disappearance has not been explained by Lybian authorities). We also differed with Iraq's Sh'ia on the decision to execute Saddam Hussein. We had concerns about the timing and the conditions in which the execution was carried. In Iran, there were different opinions on this matter also.

On Israel and Palestine.
The creation of Israel is the result of a denial; denying the Palestinians their right on their land. Time will do nothing to this fact and Palestinian rights must be respected. The two state solution is not possible, it is not realistic. The best solution is a one state solution. One democratic state on the entire territory of Palestine in which Jews, Muslims and Christians can live and coexist. The name of such a state is not important, it can be agreed upon by all parties.

What will happen if the Palestinian national unity government signs a peace agreement with Israel?
We supported the Mecca agreement signed by Hamas and Fatah. The Palestinian problem should be left to Palestinians themselves to decide and we should not impose upon them a solution (as we should not impose upon Lebanese a solution they don't agree with). Our first responsibility goes for Lebanon and its occupied territory, not Palestine.

If a global peace agreement is signed between Israel and Arab countries, will Hezbollah recognize Israel ?
There are too many ifs. We will define our position in due time according to the regional and international contexts.

Al-Qaida.
Our disagreements with this movement are numerous and they concern Religion and Politics. This movement the non participation of Islamic movements i n national elections while we in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, as well as the Muslim brothers in Egypt, are engaged in the political electoral process. Moreover, Al-Qaida denounces Muslims who depart from Al-Qaida's political and religious agenda and does not refrain from killing them. That is not our conception of Religion and Politics. Some tried to suggest the existence of links between our movement and Al-Qaida but nobody has been able to substantiate this claim with the slightest proof. We will never engage if fight against them as we do not intend to fight anybody who does not attack us (Nasrallah is sending a message here to Sunni Muslim extremists in Lebanon linked to Al-Qaida whose presence was revealed by the article of Seymour Hersh, the redirection, and who seem to infiltrate Lebanon with the blessings of the US and its allies, the Sanyura government and Saudi Arabia).

Risk of war.
If there is a war on Lebanon, the situation will be totally different from what was before the July war when Israel attacked Lebanon. We have vacated the border positions between Israel and Lebanon and they are now occupied by the Lebanese army. If Israel were to attack again, the role of the army will be to defend the Lebanese territory. We are present in the south because we live in the cities and villages of the south. Our combatants come from these cities and villages, they can fight in the next war. The UNIFIL will be in a very difficult position: either it will be a spectator of the war or it will help repel the aggression. It can also retreat. None of these solutions is satisfactory. Some are surprised and concerned that we are renewing our weapons arsenal but they do not react the same way to the fact that Israel is seeking weapons from the US and is preparing for war through maneuvers and intensive training



Read here my post: Hassan Nasrallah, the New Face of Moderation in Lebanon and the Middle East



Notes
[1] The principle of velayat e-faqih, or the government of the doctrine, is to assign an important power to the guide of the community of the faithfuls in the Shi'ite religion. Since the creation of the Islamic republic of Iran, this position was attributed to ayatollah Khomeini and is now filled by Ali Khamenei. This principle is disputed by many Shi'ite clerics. It is accepted by Hezbollah while rejected by ayatollah Mohammad Fadlallah, one of the highest ranking Shi'a clerics in Lebanon. Fadlallah is considered also as someone who is close to Hezbollah.


Read how Haaretz reports on Hezbollah's public declarations about its weapons arsenal. It seems that Hezbollah is doing this just to offset Israel.

26.2.07

Velayati on Iran, the Nuclear Row, Iraq, Lebanon, and the ME

Ali Akbar Velayati has served for almost 17 years as foreign affairs minister in the successive governments of the Iranian Islamic revolution and became, 10 years ago, special advisor on foreign affairs for the supreme guide of the revolution, Ali Khamenei. He is very much in the spotlight since the recent escalation opposing the US and Israel to Iran on the development of Iran's nuclear capacity for civil purposes, as Iranians insist and repeat (within the Non Prolifeartion treaty) while the US and Israel are maintaining that Iran's nuclear activity is not for civil purposes. However, as I mentioned before, Velayati's presence is not felt in the anglo press or the press 'corps' of the countries advocating a war against Iran; US and UK.

I took it upon myself, with some fellow bloggers, Naj, Homeyra, Loopy, and others, to fill in the void, as much as possible, by translating the interviews from the Francophone press and posting some basic knowledge on Iran and its two recent revolutions. Indeed the Islamic revolution is called as such because it was encouraged by the US over another revolution, the leftist secularist revolution that fought the Shah in an alliance with Islamists to find itself overwhelmed by the Us hostility from the outside and the Islamists from the inside.

This is the latest interview with Velayati published by le Monde (february 21st, 2007, link at the end) and it was made while the UN security council was considering another resolution for sanctions against Iran. I have updated with some comments at the end.


In this interview, Velayati confirms Iran's willingness for open and non conditional negotiations while suggesting that the international community should not be intimidated by the agressive slogans of some leaders (in the context it must be understood that he is alluding at the same time to Bush and Ahmadi-Nejad. Read what follows). He maintains that only the supreme guide of the revolution has the last word in all matters. He also lamented the absence of an active role for European countries in the Middle East, especially France. Velayati seemed to suggest that this role is much needed to counter the US unilateralism in the ME.

Le Monde: What was Ali Larijani's (Iranian negotiator)message when he met on February 20th the IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei ?

Velayati: The message is we want to pursue negotiations. There is no disagreement that cannot be resolved by discussions . At the same time, one cannot dictate a solution in advance of any negotiation. This dossier has two red lines: the first is the fundamental right of Iran to nuclear technology for civil purposes given by the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the other is the guarantee that Iran must give on the absence of any plan for military escalation by developing nuclear energy. Between these two lines everything is possible in negotiations or discussions about our nuclear program.

Le Monde: Even a temporary suspension of Uranium enrichment ?

Velayati: M. Larijani is open to all propositions without exclusion. We have already suspended enrichment during two years and a half but this suspension didn't solve the problem. There are also other ideas we must not discard like the one we came with to create an international consortium on Uranium enrichment on the Iranian soil managed by Europeans and open to IAEA control (Russia has defended this idea in the previous crisis in the Iranian nuclear row). france has the capacity to form such a consortium. We have a history of nuclear collaboration and mutual trust with France who, in the past, had the project for a nuclear reactor for civil purposes at Darakhoin near Ahwaz in the 70s. We are and still shareholders in Eurodif. All this might facilitate the resuming of the discussions with France on our civil nuclear projects and adress the concerns of other countries on our nuclear capacity. The moment is suitable for such a move.

You know Iran is four times larger than Iraq and is three times more populated with a higher degree of mobilisation and a ready army. I don't see them risking war against us in these conditions.

Le Monde: How do you analyse French policies toward what is going on in Lebanon ? (to my readers, France is much more close to the US policies when it comes to Lebanon)

Velayati: France is wasting the political and culutral investments it had in this country. It threw itself in the hole digged by the US. If Paris does not want to lose its credit in Lebanon, it must abstain from taking sides with a small fraction of the population. In addition, France has withdrawn its support to an old time ally, general Michel Aoun, the chief of the Free Patriotic Movement, which is christian (allied to Hezbollah and Amal in their will to enlarge the present US backed Sanyura government to all sects and make it more representative of Lebanese, you can read their statement by clicking on the front page banner on this blog)

Le Monde: Jacques Chirac had previously thought od sending an envoy to tehran to discuss the situation in Lebanon. What do you think of this ?

Velayati: This is an excellent idea. There is a common interest to Iran and France in joining efforts to defend Lebanon. Talks between france and Iran could not only be beneficial to Lebanon but to all the ME and the Gulf regions. As we are speaking, the US is the only powerbroker in the ME and this unilaterlaism, which is denounced also by president Putin, is Bad. We aknowledge with much regret that Europe is absent from this scene, it does not play any role in the region and I deplore this fact. A European presence in which france plays a major role can potentailly reequilibrates the situation in the ME.

Le Monde: M. Chirac refuses to talk to Syria. What is your opinion ?

Velayati: Frankly, I must admit that France's position toward Syria is extreme and it is counterproductive to France. Other countries are profiting from this hostility. However Iran can play a role in future medations between the two countries.

Le Monde: Wars in Afghanistan, Irak and Lebanon have reinforced your central role in the region. Iran promotes stability but at the same time helps moveents like Hezbollah and Moqtada Sadr in Irak. The US is accusing Iran of arming the insurgents in Iraq. Why don't you make a move toward calming the situation by withdrawing your financial support for Hezbollah for example ?

Velayati: Certainly not ! It is not by abandoning Shi'a and Hezbollah in their fight against Israël that we are going to be useful in the region. As for the rest, Iran needs stability at its frontiers. Do you believe that the coalition forces in Afghanistan could have defeated the Talibans without our support ? In Iraq, we support the Maliki government and we work toward peace. There are no insurgents in Iraq, there are only resistants to the occupation

Interview by Marie-Claude Decamps

My Comments: Between the previous interview, published initially by Le Temps on February 14th, and this one which appeared on February 21st, Iran's position has evolved for the worse. What happened in one week ? A second resolution against Iran is being submitted by the US to the countries of the UN security council.

While Velayati is maintaining the possibility for open negotiations as well as the two red lines drawn by Iran for these negotiations, Iran's right to civil nuclear energy and its duty to account for its nuclear activity within international standards and IAEA rules, he seems to be more on the offensive both on the diplomatic and the psychological fronts. This attitude can be seen in the following elements:

-When he suggests that a war against Iran is unlike the war against Iraq because of the internal mobilisation, the size of both the country and the people, when compared to Iraq, as well as the state of readiness of the Iranian army;

-When he reminds us that Iran was instrumental in the victory against the talibans in 2001;

-When he reminds us of Iran's influence in the ME notably on regimes and political groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, making a war against Iran a risk for the region;

-When he suggests a bigger role for France and Europe in general in the development of Iran's civil nuclear energy. Iran is looking for a partner for dialogue because it knows that the US is not interested in dialogue;

- When he suggests that Iran's influence in the region be used to promote peace and not war as when he mentions the mediation role Iran can play between France and Syria regarding the crisis in Lebanon. Clearly, Mr. Velayati has gone from being defensive in the first interview to offensive. What changed in one week is not only the fact that a second more hostile resolution is being prepared against Iran but that this resolution is being prepared on the sole basis that Iran is pursuing Uranium enrichment, something the IAEA was able to check, even though this enrichment is still, at this stage of the negotiations, at a non threatening level, for civil purposes. The attitude of the US is purely unacceptable because while Iran is poised for dialogue, compromise and open to control of its nuclear activity, the other side wants it to surrender this activity even though it is done within a legal framework, for civil purposes and within the NPT rules. This is why Velayati says that one cannot just set up the results for any negotiations before they actually take place. Indeed the US is asking that Iran stops any enrichment of Uranium in order to start negotiations while the halt to the Uranium enrichment should be the result of the negotiations !

What will happen next is that severe sanctions, if voted by the UN security council, will stop dialogue and Iran will be able to pursue its nuclear program outside international rules. This catastrophic scenario had already been played in North Korea where it yielded catastrophic results. One has to understand that we are here more close to the north Korea case than to Iraq. the US does not have the means going to war against Iran, and I really hope the neocons know that. The only thing that the US will be able to implement are sanctions and verbal escalation making, once again, the world less safe, more agressive and less productive for economies, except those sponsored by Cheney, Bush and Israel, arms trades and any other war related economy...

The previous interview of Velayati in le Temps







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