'In The Shadow Of Sectarianism': When US scholars produce a posteriori justifications for their country’s foreign policy

Sectarianism: a basic definition is ‘Being ideologically in the confines of one’s own sect’

This is a comment on an interview with MaxWeiss published on Jadaliyya around his book ‘In the shadow of sectarianism’.  It is not a comment on his book of the same title. 

Weiss : 

« I suppose the central question at the heart of my book is: How did the Lebanese Shi`a become sectarian? »

The hypothesis, as it is stated, rests on one of these two assumptions :

1)   Lebanese were sectarians and Shi'a were not but became sectarians later.

2)   None of the Lebanese communities became sectarians, only Shi'a did. 

From a methodological perspective, this is a question that already contain an answer which validates the hypothesis that Shi'a sectarianism is to be treated separately from others.

But because it is impossible to treat the question of Shi'a sectarianism separately from others, Weiss is forced to formulate a secondary hypothesis which appears as an ad hoc hypothesis by stating that his study of Shi'a sectarianism is a case study in sectarianism.  This secondary ad hoc hypothesis is acceptable in itself but doesn’t fit well with the main hypothesis as it is stated.

« Therefore, I concluded that there was some value in considering the institutionalization of sectarianism and Shi`ism together, as part of what might be called a sort of case study in the critical historical analysis of Lebanese sectarianism. »

Weiss couldn’t decide if his book is the study of Shi’a sectarianism as a case study of sectarianism in Lebanon or a study of Shi’a sectariansim without reference to other communities. In other words he is methodologically engaged, by definition, in studying sectarianism from a Shi'a sectarian perspective, within the confines of one sect.

The focal point of the book, Weiss says, is:

« that the Shi`i community in Lebanon became sectarian—which for me also meant starting to practice being sectarian—during the period of French Mandate rule (1918-1943) »

This was the period of the institutionnalisation of sectarianism in the Middle East for all sects under the French and the English mandates which took territories from the defeated Ottoman empire as ‘sacred trusts’ and transformed them into countries. One Wonder what’s in the Shi’a sectarianism for Weiss?

Weiss is interested in Shi’a sectarianism as sectarianism with regard to Sunnis, and not to other sects  in Lebanon, something that he doesn’t state openly in his interview but that is illustrated with a picture showing religious dignitaries from both sects. Weiss situates the rise of Shi’a sectarianism around the French mandate but does not attribute it to the French mandate.  Under the French mandate Shi’a assumed a more independant and visible role than during the Ottoman empire when they were persecuted, forced to convert, and displaced.  Normally, this is where one should search for the roots of Shi’a sectarianism.  Maybe Weiss does tackle the question in his book.  But I found it strange that there is not one occurrence for the word Sunni in Weiss’s interview in Jadaliyya.  I bet also that there is very little in his book.  

Ottoman rule was caracterised by religious tolerance but certainely not at the end when European countries started waging a war on the empire at its confines by heightening sectarian tensions.  Was the persecution of Shi’a the result of this process? 

Based on his argument that Shi’a sectarianism developed under the French mandate but was not the result of the French mandate, Weiss argues that there is ‘sectarianisation from below’ initiated by the community, as opposed to ‘sectarianisation from above’ imposed by rulers.  But by situating the start of Shi’a sectarianism with the French mandate, he completely obliterates the fact that  what he calls ‘sectarianism from below’ was provoked by persecutions before the French mandate which might be considered, in fact, as a sectariansim 'from above'.  And while he absolves the French from being at the origins of Shi'a sectarianism we don't know if he does the same for other sects.  It is notorious that the French are behind the structuring of the political system in Lebanon in a sectarian one and have played a role in the sectarianisation of the Shi'a 'from above' by instituting privileges for other sects.

But opening the question of Shi'a sectarianism to the Ottoman period and to sectarianism among other sects under the French rule might weaken Weiss's argument for a 'sectarianism from below'

What interests Weiss is modern history of Shi’a in Lebanon and ‘Alawi in Syria (on whish he is writing a book), in other words, the  Gordian knot of the ‘Shi’a crescent’ 

« By the time that Imam Musa al-Sadr arrived on the Lebanese scene in the late 1950s, therefore, a foundation for the mobilization of a specifically Shi`i politics was well in place. »

This is why he states that sectarianism, particularly in this case, is:

« built upon and shored up by certain institutions and practices, which might include parochial schools, the allocation of political positions according to sectarian metrics, the primacy afforded to communal law courts over and above other jurisdictions, and a deeply divided media environment » 

But when Musa al-Sadr arrives on the 'Lebanese scene' there are no strong institutions for Shi'a or deeply divided media environement between Shi'a and Sunnis.  At the time Shi'a called themselves Al-Mahroumin (The Deprived).  Shi’a were battered by a border war between  Israel and the Palestinians, forced to move again by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and left deprived by the state.  Here again, Weiss overlooks the persecution and deprivation factors in the construction of sectarianism,  and to take into account these two factors is to render the distinction between ‘sectarianism from above’ and ‘sectarianism from below’ totally useless because persecutions and deprivations come from above.

And while arguing that sectarianism could be ‘modified or undone’ he admits that once enshrined in institutions,

« It will be difficult, if not impossible, to combat or even defeat sectarianism in all its forms without clear-eyed attention to the array of institutional venues in which sectarianism has been and continues to be produced, nurtured, and sustained. »

And here he warns about Iraq.  

It is ironic that at the end of the interview in which he lays out his argument about Shi’a sectarianism, Weiss warns about Iraq.  Ironic because if there is a case for Shi’a secatarianism continually and exclusively nurtured from above, either through the English mandate, persecutions or, as of 2003, by an imposed ‘democracy’ without civil institutions (or sectarianism from below), it can be found in Iraq.   In fact Iraq might well be a perfect example of how Europe and the West played the sectarian game to finish off the Ottoman empire and how they continue to play it until today to further divide the remnants of this empire.  In the Middle East, it's been sectarianism 'from above' all the way from the fall of the Ottoman empire to the 'Arab Spring'.

By arguing for a sectarianism 'from below’ Weiss is doing nothing more than an a posteriori justification to the current western game of sectarianism in the Middle East and his hypothesis is no more then a fallacy containing its own confirmation leaving out the main factors in the radicalisation of identities around communities and sects; persecutions, deprivations and fear.  The same is true of excessive privileges.  Where Shi'a sectarianism have been provoked by persecutions, other sectarianisms were provoked by excessive privileges given from above. Sectarianism cannot be treated as a phenomenon of one sect only, it plants its roots wherever there is deep inequality elevating barriers between self and other and between communities.

Update:  I found this review of Weiss's book by Alexander Henley There are at least two other reviews of this book and I will try to make them available on this post soon.

P.S.  Upon reading the interview, I was angry that not only Jadaliyya published an interview on a book that is a propaganda for US foreign policy among scholars and university students promoting sectarianism as part of who we are, but that they didn't bother asking the author questions that should have been asked.  Weiss seems also incapable of speaking about the Middle East without the lens and language of sectarianism.

Swimming against the current: Emmanuel Todd on Islam and the West

In his new book 'Le Rendez-vous des civilisations', French demographist, sociologist, historian and political scientist Emmnanuel Todd, with fellow scientist Youssef Courbage, prove, with scientific data based on demographics, birth rates, education, and some other factors studied by demographists, that Islam is a religion moving toward secularisation, as other religions did before.

This is an excerpt from an interview with Todd published in the French magazine Marianne, and translated in Truth.org.

"Iran worries some observers more than Iraq did before the American intervention.

The question of Iran presents itself in the form of a stream of images and facts difficult to interpret as seen from France. There are the absurd statements of President Ahmadinejad, images of women covered in black and the ambient Islamophobia. All that masks the deep reality of Iran: a society in the midst of rapid cultural development, in which there are more women than men enrolled in university, a country in which the demographic revolution has reduced the number of children per woman to two, as in France or the United States. Iran is in the process of giving birth to a pluralistic democracy. It's a country where, certainly, not everyone can stand for election, but where people vote regularly and where swings in opinion and majority are frequent. Like France, England and the United States, Iran has lived through a revolution that is stabilizing itself and where a democratic temperament is blossoming.

All that must be related to a religious matrix in which the Shiite variation of Islam values interpretation, debate and, ultimately, revolt.

For a simple Western observer, the similarity between Shiism and Protestantism is not particularly obvious.

It would be ridiculous to push this comparison to the extreme. But it is clear that - just as Protestantism was an accelerator of progress in European history and Catholicism was a break - Shiism today brings a positive contribution to development, notably in the domain of birth control: Azerbaijan, certainly post-Communist, but also Shiite, has a 1.7 fertility rate, while the Shiite Alawite regions of Syria have completed their demographic transition, unlike the majority-Sunni regions. In Lebanon, the Shiite community, Hezbollah's social base, was behind on the educational and social levels, but is in the process of catching up with the other communities, as one sees in the development of fertility rates.

Iran is also a very big nation that demonstrates a realistic awareness of its strategic interest in a region where most of its neighbors possess the nuclear weapon: Pakistan, (and, via the presence of the American Army) Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel. In that context, the reasonable European attitude would be to accompany Iran in its liberal and democratic transition and to understand its security preoccupations.

In your book, you make the altogether surprising hypothesis of a possible secularization of Muslim societies.

To the extent that within the Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Buddhist worlds, the drop in fertility has always been preceded by a weakening of religious practice, one must wonder whether the Muslim countries in which the number of children per woman is equal to or less than two are not also in the process of experiencing, unknown to us - and perhaps also unknown to their leaders - a process of secularization. That's the case of Iran."

MORE

Also: Secularism and Islamism in the Arab World (thanks Issam)

In The Name Of The Father

A Portrait of Saad Hariri and his father, and of Lebanon's recent history.
In Condé Nast, By Kevin Gray.

But there is also a shrewd political calculation behind Saad’s outbursts. As the power broker for all Sunnis in Lebanon, Saad must make sure Shiites don’t infringe on his base’s interests.So when Hezbollah pinned Siniora behind barbed wire, it was understood as a threat to Sunni power, not just to the government. Saad made sure Sunnis rose up in their strongholds at Sidon and Tripoli, staging massive rallies that were broadcast on his Future TV.

Saad has been willing to play that sectarian card in a way his allies consider risky. He has been accused of funding Al Qaeda-inspired Sunni jihadists in Lebanon. A close adviser told me that doing so was a necessary evil. But less than 24 hours after the adviser’s admission, in early May, one such group attacked the army. Saad’s Western patrons say they’re worried about such ties. “We’re not particularly comfortable with some of his relationships,” a Western official tells me just days before the fighting breaks out. But the U.S. is also playing a similar game in the region, backing Sunni militants as a way to counter Iran. After all, the U.S. may very much like—and need—Saad’s combative friends.

According to the article, Sanyura is a kind of prince consort for March 14th who were, ever since Hariri father died, grooming his son to become the prime minister of Lebanon. If that's true, I forsee a very dark future for Lebanon made of sectarian strife and a latent civil war...Saad will never be a statesman. He will be a good puppet for Saudi Arabia (and by extension presently for the US and France) where he grew up, where he holds a citizenship, and where he nurtures a family and business and political ties.

Read the whole article

Another interesting read
Solidere: Vigilantism under color of law. Or the story of the intimate intricacies between political and business interests of the Hariris and their company, Solidere, meant to 'build' Lebanon after the civil war.

Bashar to Ban Ki Moon: We are in the eye of the storm and you need to stay in contact with us

Revealed by Le Monde, a strange conversation took place last April between Syrian president Bashar El Assad (BEA) and UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon. It gives a fresh and new perspective on BEA as a head of state and politician but it also gives a clearer picture of the weakness of the new UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon, not only toward his US masters but also toward any head of state and official he meets. It is clear from the conversation that Ban Ki Moon is considered as a US puppet and everything that is said to him by officials is meant to be conveyed to his masters. Lets turn now to the conversation's minutes partially published today by Le Monde and translated here.

The meeting, which lasted more than an hour, was held on April 24th in the presidential palace in Damascus, before the UN took the decision for the Hariri international tribunal.
The situation in Iraq is mentioned but most of the conversation turns around Lebanon. BKM insists on the important role that Syria must play in order to supress Lebanon's internal divisions. He thinks Damascus must encourage the creation of the international tribunal to judge the assassins of Rafiq Hariri, and not the contrary.

The answer of BEA is pungent: "Sectarian and ethnic divisions have been deeply rooted in Lebanese society for more than 300 years. Lebanese society is very fragile and it stabilised only during the Syrian presence between 1976 and 2005 after which Lebanon entered a new period of political instability again."
"The political instability in Lebanon, added BEA, will be aggravated by the special tribunal, especially if it is under chapter seven of the UN convention, which is binding, reinforcing the constraining aspect of the tribunal. That may easily initiate a conflict and can potentially degenerate into a civil war, provoking divisions between sunnis and shias from the Meditterranean to the Caspian seas. This might have grave consequences extending beyond the Lebanese frontier.

"In the eye of the storm"
Syria, said BEA, has always played a constructive role in Lebanon, contrary to the roles played by France and the US. The influence of these two last countries is destructive to Lebanon.
Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mouallem, intervenes at that point to harshly criticize the US ambassador to Lebanon, Jeff Feltman. "Feltman must leave the country. I am ready to offer him a vacation in Hawaï."
BKM, unable to react, continues to recite his well learned lesson, and pleads for a reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria. "The present lebanese government is illegal'', replies BEA. ''The Syrian people hate the March 14th movement led by Fouad Siniora. I tried to talk to Siniora, but it is now impossible. However, if a unity government including the opposition is formed, Syria will revise its stance."
BKM continues to recite his lesson and expresses his fears concerning Iran's nuclear ambitions. "As an oriental, you must understand, replies BEA. Iran is a regional power and must be recognised as such. They have the capacity to derail the entire Middle east and beyond. (…) There will be no positive evolution on this question as long as the West does not recognise to Iran the right to be a nuclear power."

The meeeting ends with the usual thanks from BKM to BEA who then says to him: "We are in the eye of the storm. You will need to stay in contact with us."

I am not sure BKM understood the metaphor.

You can hate BEA, you can call him names, you can despise him, but you cannot deny that he is right in what he says. Arrogant yes, but right. Speaking about facts might also look arrogant for an international community which is increasingly neglecting facts, building foreign policies only on the fantasies of the neocon new world order.

The source article in French

P.S and Update: An anonymous reader protested (in an impolite way, go my Néthique's Icon at the top of the blog page if you want to understand what impoliteness) that there might be some translations problems because to plead for ''the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon'' is to ignore that there was never official representation in the first place between Syria and Lebanon.
I am sorry to tell this reader that I had to rely on the article of Le Monde, which, in turn, relied on the minutes of the meeting. The article states: ''M. Ban enchaîne, plaidant pour le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre le Liban et la Syrie.'' I doubt Le Monde's journalist mistranslated from the minutes, which might have been in English. However, I believe BKM, or those who wrote the script for him, are totally ignorant of the historic of the situation, which might explain the absence of historic perspective to the words he used in the meeting. As for myself I have to stick to my source, which is le Monde's article.

Puppet Iraqi Prime Minister Rejects Critiques of Saddam's Execution

Lemonde.fr, AFP 06.01.07 12h04 • Updated, 06.01.07 13h04
Translation from French
On Saturday January 6th, 2007, Iraqi prime minister, Nouri El-Maliki, speaking on the aftermath of the execution of Saddam during a military ceremony in honor of the 86th foundation anniversary of the Iraqi army, north of Baghdad, threatened states who criticised the execution of Saddam by stating that the Iraqi government will ''have to revise its diplomatic relations with all states who did not seem to respect the will of the Iraqi people''.
This was the first official reaction of the Iraqi government after the hanging of former Iraqi preisdent on the Muslim religious holiday Eid Al-Adha, December 30th.

"We reject and condemn official and media reactions of some governments...We are staggered by these reactions which are litterally shedding tears over a despot under the pretext that he was executed on a holy day while Saddam has always violated holy celebrations. We consider these critics as an insidious sedition and a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, as well as an affront to the families of the vicitims of Saddam''

According to El-Maliki, the execution of Saddam, contrary to what the ennemies of the Iraqi people are claiming, ''was not the result of a political decision''. ''It was the result of a just trial, which Saddam did not really deserve.''

A pirate video taken with a cellphone and shown on the internet has prompted the indignation of the international community. The video shows Saddam being insulted and hackled by Shias witnesses who were present at the execution.

Comment: There was only little mention in Maliki's remarks of Western critiques, that were mostly about fair trial and Human rights, when he says that Saddam did not deserve a just trial. In which, Maliki actually confirms Western fears about the standards for Human rights of the present Iraqi government. However, most of his remarks were adressed to Arab critiques.
No matter how much Maliki's remarks are laughable in terms of contradictions and sheer stupidity, delivered at a military ceremony, they can be considered as belligerant and are directed mostly against Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab countries who protested the execution on religious grounds. The US has created a monster in Iraq, a new sectarian monster that is under its command to loosen when it is suitable to give the impression of a new threat to the security of the region and of the international community. The war against Iran is being prepared in Iraq with the help of stupid shias American puppets like El-Maliki; executing Saddam on a holy sunni celebration, raising the ire of Sunnis, and consequently shias counterreactions, and giving Saudi Arabia, Dick Cheney, and Bush, a reason to 'stay the course' in the Middle East, a macabre course, by all means.
In few words, Maliki has shown both disregard for Human rights and his will to dismiss any critique of his government's non respect for religious communities rights in Iraq, other than his own sect. Can anybody tell me how the new neo-con engineered Iraq is better than Saddam's Iraq ?

Read the latest on Saddam's execution critiques via Middle East Memo

Living Together: Nasrallah's Speech to the December 1st protest

This is a translation of the account given in French of Nasrallah's speech to the December 1st protest, on Thursday December 7th, by Libnanews.

Supressing any sign in the protest that can be interpreted as violence.
He started his speech by asking his supporters not to resort to an old Lebanese and middle eastern tradition; firing shots of celebration at the end of the speech.

Greetings.
He greeted the protesters then evoked the spirit of the young protester, Ahmed Mahmoud, who was shot last sunday probably as a result of an attack on a group of protesters joining the protest site by militiamen from the Future movement led by Saad Hariri.

Critique of the present government, March 14th and foreign and Arab leaders in light of the latest israeli agression on lebanon.
He declared being proud of the protesters who are defying the ennemies of Lebanon, those who led a savage war on lebanon last July. He called upon them to resist any attempt to weaken the protest by those who supported the July Israeli agression on Lebanon ad who support the present government. He called on Arab leaders not to favour one party in Lebanon over another but to assist all Lebanese in order to help them not to yield under the pressure of the terrorist Bush. He invited all Arabs to open their eyes on the reality of the failing US foreign policy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.
He found offensive the open support israel is granting to the Sanyura government targeting the magnanimous in Lebanon in order to curb their support for the December 1st protest.

A unity government with a blocking power for the opposition, no matter who is in the opposition, that's all what the December protest is about.
He highlighted the necessity of a national union government representing all Lebanese, insisting on the particular context and structure of the Lebanese society which requires a representation that adresses the concerns of all its communities. On this basis he is asking that the opposition be granted a third of the seats in the government allowing it to block some decisions, whether this opposition is Hezbollah and its allies or the actual government.

A unity government with or without the actual government consent and by peaceful means.
Nasrallah asked to maintain the protest as long as the present government stays with its actual composition. He asked that the protest be peaceful avoiding any insults, clashes or conflicts which can lead to a civil war. He assured the international community that no matter what happens Hezbollah will never brandish its weapons against its lebanese brothers because lebanese understand that a civil war is a defeat for them and a victory for their Israeli ennemy who wishes that lebanon be thrown into dark abysses. He noticed, alluding to Saudi Arabia's and Egypt's recent remarks against the anti-Sanyura protest, that Israel is already inciting these Arab leaders to throw panic on the lebanese by warning them from a risk of civil war.

Hezbollah's intentions on the short term and its code of conduct during the protest.
Nasrallah confirmed that his party will fight those who intended to plant discord among Lebanese by killing Ahmed Mahmoud. He said that a thousand others Ahmed Mahmoud may fall but the Hezbollah resistance will not be driven into raising its arms against its Lebanese brothers and those who would fall would have done so for the love of their country, Lebanon. Hezbollah will work to avoid civil war in Lebanon. Hezbollah will maintain peaceful protests without resorting to any form of armed protest defying his detractors who are staking on a possible conflict. He exhorted Lebanese not to fall in the trap made by forces close to the Sanyura government whop are trying to portray the actual confrontation as a confrontation between Sunnis and Shias. He insisted that the opposition to the Sanyura government is composed of lebanese from all religions and sects and invited the Arab league (this same Arab league who does not move a finger when palestinians are slaughtered by Isreal but who seems mved by the opposition to the Sanyura government) to inquire on the site of the protest about the fact that the opposition to Sanyura comes from all religions and sects. He noted that any sectarian provocation is an act that goes against Religion, against Humanity and against morals.

The goal of Hezbollah on the long term.
He said that his party does not covet seats by asking for a unity government. He said that his party is ready to give these seats to any other movement in the opposition at the condition that the representation be fair. He said his party does not covet a throne neither a tomb (this an allusion to the political assassinations within March 14th) but a national unity government. he criticised the actual government as a government supported by the 'royal' courts of Bush and Olmert, rather than being a sunni government and that if this government was really a sunni government he would not oppose it.
(Nasrallah is criticising here the political maneuvres of the actual government which is asking the backing of traditional sunni states such as Egypt, Jordan and saudi Arabia, and sunni oulémas inside Lebanon, by appearing as sunni).
He called on Arab states for the creation of an Islamic or Arab judiciary council appointed to inquire on the legal aspects of the late Israeli agression on Lebanon in order and on the present sectarian agitation some are resorting to. He condemned those who (in Lebanon) encouraged and even pushed Bush and Cheney to launch a savage war on a Hezbollah resistance they could not disarm. He specified that those who encouraged the latest israeli agression on Lebanon are in the actual government and asked that they be tried for treason. He specified that he was not accusing all March 14th politicains but those who, being part of this March 14th coalition, sat on the same table as Bush and Cheney and asked them to initiate a war on Lebanon. He said that he was not going to name names and wishes he will may be obliged to do so in front of the international community. He also accuses Israel of opening a prison camp with a 10 000 men capacity in anticipation of the imprisonment of members of the actual Lebanese opposition.

Message to Sanyura: If you come to us we will forgive and we are determined in our demands and our forgiveness .
Hezbollah's leader adressed Sanyura knowing that he might be listening from his Prime Ministerial residence surrounded by the protests. He sermoned him for issuing an order to the Lebanese army to block ammunitions transfer to the resistance in the south while this resistance was battling the ennemy and defending the country. he asked how a Prime Minister of a country in war could try to block a resistance that even savage Israeli bombardments were not able to deter ? He however declared that he comes from a culture inclined to forgive and attached to Human values and tolerance and because of that he forgives his lebanese brothers who deviantly wanted to harm the resistance and who recently permitted a supposedly sunni terrorist network to infiltrate Lebanon with the goal of assassinating him.

He invited Sanyura to accept a national unity government and he warned that if Sanyura continues to oppose a unity government a time will come when the opposition wil withdraw the proposal in favor of a pure resignation of Sanyura's government. In which case, those who will lead the new government must allow Sanyura or anybody else who will be in the opposition a blocking majority because the promise of a fair and balanced government will be maintained. Lebanon being a country built on consensus, all political forces must be represented in the new cabinet.

Shias, Sunnis and Christians united in their faith for one God.
Nasrallah invited those who believe in the same God to aprticipate in a prayer Friday December 8th and asked shiites protesters to pray with sunnis at 11th instead of their usual prayer performed at 12.

He also called Lebanese to participate Sunday, 3 p.m., in a planned meet-up to renew and reaffirm the will of the December 1st protest not to bow to a government manipulated by foreign forces.

He concluded by promising victory to Lebanese from all confessions and parties and hailed the spirit of the protest victim and of all the protesters.

Angry Arab's analysis of the speech.

Google video of the speech (Arabic)

Addendum: I am listening now to the speech and I think what Libnanews missed is the harsh indictment of the Bush administration on Iraq asking how could Sanyura's government trust the people who ignited a civil war in Iraq and killed its children. He also ridiculed the Sanyura government by telling that this government can boast about having been the subject of a special meeting of the Israeli cabinet (who does such meetings only when the interests of Israel are at stake) with the goal of finding solutions to help Sanyura !
This is why I keep telling that we should leave the anti-Syria, pro-Syria characterisations of the present forces in lebanon and adopt the pro-USrael and anti-USrael categorisations.
Nasrallah praised also the neutrality of the Lebanese army but criticised the internal security forces controlled by the government and invited them to act in neutrality. He mentioned also attempts from the government at intimidating some sunni Oulémas who support the opposition in a clear strategy of mobilisation along sectarian lines.
He also asked : 'Do you want a government who takes his orders from amabassador Feltman or Secretary Rice ?'