Book Review: Les chemins de Damas

The roads to Damascus (Les chemins de Damas)

France knows Syria well.  It carved out the country from the remnants of the Ottoman empire.  But France, who opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, gambled the hard line on regime change in Syria and lost.  The recent crisis in Syria, said recently ‘Les chemins de Damas’ author to L’orient Le Jour, has been treated in France with emotions and political irrealism.

The authors of ‘Les chemins de Damas’, Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, are successively Grand reporter at RTL and journalist at Le Figaro.  They were both taken hostages by an alQaida affiliated group in Iraq in 2004 for four months.  Malbrunot and Chesnot have been keen observers of the Middle East and jihadist groups.  They published on Iraq and Qatar, and Malbrunot has published on Palestine.   Malbrunot writes a blog on the Middle East for Le Figaro and he is the only French reporter to have met and interviewed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in the most critical period of the crisis in 2012.  Assad gave recently an interview to Paris Match in December 2014, and today to Foreign Affairs.

‘Les Chemins de Damas’ is an investigation into how the Syrian crisis was mismanaged by Paris, despite a deep knowledge of Syria formed by a long history of hostility and collaboration at the diplomatic and intelligence levels between the two countries.  The main sources for Chesnot and Malbrunot are the principal actors of this long history.  That’s one of the many strengths of the book.  The book has also annexes of previously unpublished intel reports and diplomatic cables, as well as a letter from Hollande to Saudi king, dated Decembre 2013, concerning the Saudi financing and buying of French military equipment destined to Lebanon and the kingdom.

The book offers a brief historical background and it is rich in historical context and covers the French-Syrian relations during a time period extending between the Lebanese civil war and the present day.  It is divided in eight sections that follow the ups and downs of the relation between France and its former colony, more exactly 'protectorate'.  The introduction is an overview of the main content while the conclusion attempts to exlain France’s attitude during the current Syria crisis suggesting France might take the road to a Damascus ruled by the Baath again.  The preface of the book is by general Philippe Rondot,  a veteran of the French secret services as well as a specialist of the Arab world.  Mr. Rondot retired only recently and he gives the authors great insight throughout the book.  His insight is informed not only by his own experience but also by his father’s legacy in the Levant. Pierre Rondot, a St Cyrien in the French army who served in Morocco and the Levant, is credited of establishing the Lebanese and Syrian secret services.  The core of the book follows the relationship during the presidencies of Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy, with the greater part devoted to the current crisis.

There is a great deal of continuity and quality in what the French know about Syria, and this is reflected in Chesnot and Malbrunot’s book, which makes the main question the book addresses all the more relevant : how could the French have been so wrong on Syria recently?  So the book tries to answer this very question.

Covert wars

The book starts by detailing the covert war that France and Syria waged on each other during the Lebanese civil war, wrestling to become the main influence in Lebanon.  This covert war started with the assassination of the French ambassador in Beirut in Septembre 1981 during what might have been the most critical period in the Lebanese civil war. The assassination was blamed first on Iran, but the French suspected Syria.  There were retaliations.  A bomb explosion at a Baath party headquarters in Damascus killed 43 people, a week after the assassination of the French ambassador in Beirut.  In 1983, few minutes after the attack on the US marines, 58 French UN soldiers die from an explosion at their barracks in Beirut.  This became known as the Drakkar post attack or the Beirut barracks bombings.  In 2008, when Bashar el-Assad was on official visit to Paris, some in France protested the visit, recalling the attack on the French soldiers, but an Elysee source told Le Monde that France blamed the assassination of the French ambassador on Syria but thought that Iran was behind the Beirut barracks bombings. 

The critical years of the Lebanese civil war, which culminated with the withdrawal of the PLO form Beirut, the massacres of Sabra and Chatila, the Israeli occupation and the killing of  the US marines and French UN soldiers, convinced the international community that the situation in Lebanon couldn’t be managed but by Syria.  France then expatriated the rebel Lebanese army commander Michel Aoun, who fought the Syrian army, and made peace with Damascus.  This would lead down the road to the Taef agreement and the pax Syriana in Lebanon that will last fifteen years, between 1990 and 2005. 

The pax Syriana will be followed by a period of relatively  good relations between Paris and Damascus.  But the French didn’t wait until the end of the Lebanese civil war to mend relations with Damascus.  François Mitterrand paid a visit to Syria in Novembre 1984.  The people close to Mitterrand at the time of the visit told the authors that Mitterrand despised the methods of Hafez but held him in great respect and was impressed by him.

There is hope for western capitals to influence Syria again after Hafez's death

But the height of the French-Syrian relations will be reached when Bashar el-Assad succeeds his father at the presidency.  Hafez el-Assad’s death has been anticipated by Paris when news of his declining health were known after the Jordanian and Israeli secret services managed to take a urine sample during his visit to  Jordan to pay his respects at king Hussein’s funerals.  Hafez was feared and expectations among regional and international players to influence the future of  Syria were henceforth permitted with Bashar.  France, like others, and maybe more than others, was eager and ready for change in Syria.

When Bashar el-Assad takes over after his father’s death, there is hope in the country and hope abroad. In the country there is hope for reforms, and in France and other western countries, there is hope that the fortress Syria, built by the respected and feared Hafez, would not and cannot be maintained by his son.  France wanted Syria's influence in Lebanon diminished.  Lebanon was and still is a source of great tension between the two countries.  While close collaborations between Damascus and Paris at the security and economic levels were ongoing, a tension was building between the two countries in Lebanon, mainly thanks to Lebanon's prime minsiter, Rafik Hariri.  

Rafik Hariri worked hand in hand with both the Syrians and the French, and it is understood that it was Hariri, whom Chirac had met earlier in 1981 at a donor’s event after his failed bid for France’s presidency, who suggested to Chirac to mentor young Bashar. Hariri’s role is dissected at length in the book and he will attempt to emancipate himself from Syria by using his personal relationship with Chirac.  There is a story about Chriac visiting Damascus for Hafez’s funerals.  He pays a visit to the French embassy where he is secretly met by Hariri welcoming him on the stairs as if he were the real owner of the place.  This small event is emblematic of Hariri and of the relations between the two men.  Chirac’s Middle East policy became hijacked by Rafik Hariri who counselled Chirac on all matters related to the Middle East, to the great dismay of the Quai d’Orsay, and the French secret services, who saw in it a ‘Harirization’ of France’s foreign policy in the region.   

Chirac wanted to act as a mentor for Bashar and Bahsar granted French advisors and companies contracts in a bid to reform the state apparatus at the adminsitrative level and open the economy to foreign and private investments.  The authors speak on many occasions of Bashar’s genuine desire to distinguish his rule from his father’s.  But Bashar faced resistance at home from an anchylosed state apparatus and administration, and from old regime apparatchiks like Abdel Halim Khaddam who would later leave Syria for a Hariri paid golden exile in France.  Bashar’s willingness to reform the state had many French experts, businessmen and academics shuttling between France and Damascus, invited to evaluate and propose partnerships and solutions, including the creation of a national school of administration modeled on the French one, which produces high level civil servants and elected officials.  The authors tell the story of the French academic, responsible for setting up the Syrian school of administration, visiting Rafik Hariri in Beirut to offer him the same deal, at the behest of Chirac who wanted to please his friend Hariri.  They say Hariri wasn’t interested.  He received the Academic in his bedroom, in his pajamas, and told her that he was more interested in the creation of business opportunities, not in governance.   

The frantic collaboration in education, culture, and business investments will resume with Sarkozy between 2008 and 2011, after the relation cools between 2005 and 2008, due to the assassination of Rafik Hariri.  Syria stood accused of assassinating Hariri, but the international community later absolved Syria only to point fingers at Hezbollah.

The Harirization of France’s foreign policy meant that France was seeing the region through the lens of political Sunni Islam since Hariri’s patron is the king of Saudi Arabia.   This might have led to a de facto rapprochement between France and the US who was also close to Saudi Arabia when it came to crafting its policies in Lebanon and Syria.

But during the period between 2000 and 2005, Hariri grew frustrated with Bashar as Bashar wasn’t letting Hariri, who was a businessman more than a politician, lay hands on Syria’s new budding economy, especially the telecom sector which the Baath considered as a sector of strategic importance not to be given to outsiders.

Regime change

Hariri was the origin of UN resolution 1559 sponsored by France and for which France cooperated closely with the US to demand all foreign armies depart Lebanon.  This was a first in France's policy in the region where it previously had a policy distinctive from the US.  But UN1559 failed to weaken the Syrian influence in Lebanon after 2005.  So after what might have been considered as a last attempt to co-opt Bashar, encouraged this time by Qatar and executed by Nicolas Sarkozy, between 2008 and 2011, a decision for direct regime change in Syria was taking shape in the minds of western politicians when the 'Arab Spring' knocked at Syria's door in Deraa.  In a recent interview with Paris-Match, Bashar el-Assad confirmed that Sarkozy’s initiative to resume good relations with Damascus was at Qatar’s behest.  It is reasonable to believe that the French were surprised by what happened in Deraa. Assad was due to make a high level visit to Paris in 2011, after his highly visible 2008 visit where he attended the Bastille day parade.  Between 2008 and 2011, Assad visited Paris at least three times, two on an official schedule and once in a private capacity with his wife.  Sarkozy’s ‘Relance’ was beneficial for France.  Between 2008 and 2011, La crème de la crème of French companies were signing contracts with the Syrian state and private French entrepreneurs were opening businesses in Syria.  However, business wasn't easy for foreign companies in Syria because of the problem of state corruption.

But despite the ups and downs,  and up until the uprising, the authors write that the security collaboration never ceased between Syria and France, even after the assassination of Rafik Hariri. France honored its contracts to deliver two Helicopters for Bashar’s personal use in June 2005, 4 months after Hariri’s assassination.  And Alcatel built a secured network of telecommunications on Mount Qassioun for fourteen of the highest ranking members of the ruling Baath party.  This despite France’s deep involvment with the international justice process that accused Syria of Hariri's assassination.  Its agents were first on the ground of the explosion that killed Hariri and members of his convoy.  France was also involved in producing a witness who was later discredited.  France hosted a re creation of the Beirut explosion on its terrirory for the international tribunal, in great secrecy, allowing only Israeli planes to fly over the site two days before the reenactment took place.  This was done without even informing homeland security about the fly-over.   

Then Deraa happened.  France seems to have been caught off-guard and was wary of not repeating the mistake of being on the wrong side as with the Tunisia revolution.  Plus, France was now feeling strong, fresh from the Libya adventure.

The agenda for regime change in Syria might have been just an idea lacking serious planning and coordination, taking shape only through improvisations along the wave of the 'Arab Spring.'  What probably weighed in the decision to proceed with precipitation in Syria was the fallout of the July 2006 war in Lebanon during which Syria provided support and weapons to Hezbollah to resist the Israeli assault.  This made Hezbollah and his Syrian and Iranian allies strong and made the matter to break this alliance urgent. 

However, the Syrian uprising was unfolding on the ground in a different manner from what was described in the media and in the communiqués of the Quai d’Orsay.  The authors write that at the height of the civil non violent protests there were only 400000 present over a total of twenty two million people. French intelligence agents, who were present on the ground in Deraa and elsewhere, witnessed violent protests by Islamists early on.   We learn for example that there were French agents in Baba 'Amr in Homs when French journalist Edith Bouvier was evacuated and that they were probably the reason why Edith Bouvier refused to be evacuated by the Syrian red crescent.  Early on, the chants weren’t ‘selmiah’ (we want peace), but ‘we want to topple Assad.’  Early on, Islamists, organised and supported from the outside, were armed on the ground.  Early on, the media lied.   The French ambassador Eric Chevalier present in Syria at the time, and who famously went to Hama on his own initiative with Robert Ford when the protests started there, complained about France24 for its biased coverage, which wasn’t in his opinion close to the reality inside Syria.  Chevalier was adamant at repeating that regime change wasn't going to be easy in Syria and that Assad wasn't going to fall. 

The irreality of the Syrian war in the media

The authors critique the media when they write that, caught by a defiant international media whose coverage was about regime change, the Syrian regime didn't want to appear bent on reforms, because there was a risk of appearing soft, and losing ground.  They also argue that if the protests were only internally motivated, asking for reforms, then a simple apology for the Deraa shootings might have worked.  This is argued in a chapter titled ‘The sorcerer’s apprentices’ and validate the early assessment made by Assad of the protests, that they were the work of external actors waging war on Syria. For instance, it is obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood led the early protests and it is known that the Muslim Brotherhood had no foothold in Syria, being an external organization, not a grassroot Syrian organization.  The authors also write that the Islamist radicals, not indigenous to Syria, did not want a pacifist rebellion which was going to leave them on the side. They prepared the ground for a military rebellion very early.  There are many indications in the book that external actors wanted to militarize the crisis.  Former deputy prime minister Abdallah Dardari confided to the authors that intercepted phone communications heard Saudis saying ‘we want blood.’  There were also calls from the radical cleric Ibn Andallah al-Hosni to kill Christians, Shias and Alawites, as early as August 2011.  The same cleric also spoke of the need for an influx of foreign fighters to make jihad in Syria, adding that, following the Libyan model, Syria needs an alliance between the West and militant Islam (quoted verbatim by the authors).   This was the time when the West thought it could control Islamist fighters and use them to achieve its ends in Libya, Syria and maybe elsewhere.  Under this tacit paradigm, western media turned a blind eye on the militarization and the sectarian and extremist characters of the rebellion, and presented a pacifist rebellion oppressed by an evil regime.  Only more than a year later, early 2013,  the media came to admit that there was some armed rebellion in Syria.  By then they started to speak of a ‘mainly pacifist rebellion.’ On the other hand, the authors write that under assault, the regime hardened its stance, and from August first to August eight 2011, many prominent pacifist militants were arrested or assassinated. Syria's tragic fate was sealed early in the crisis.

Once the uprising turned to militarization, western powers, France included, who by then uttered only the usual ‘Assad must go’, delegated the management of the crisis to Qatar.  They will come to regret it later.  Contacts were taken with secular opponents of the regime to join the external opposition, which was mainly Islamist, for the sole purpose to hide both the Islamist and militaristic aspect of the uprising, to make the uprising appear as an internal one, and to provide a fig leaf to a full blown war on Syria by external powers.  But the fig leaf won’t work for long, secular figures were a minority in the opposition.  Under the patronage of Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood imposed its conditions, using secular figures without giving them support, and refusing a proposal to form an internal opposition council, which would have led to a diminished Brotherhood influence.

In octobre 2011, When Sarkozy’s foreign minister Alain Juppé meets with the newly formed opposition council, with secular fig leaves Kodmani and Ghalioun as members, he speaks of France’s support for the pacifist revolution.  But by then the ‘revolution’ was fully militarized and fully Islamist.

The drive for a war of intervention led by France and the UK with chemical weapons as casus belli

The chapter titled ‘La haine’ (the hate) exposes the attempts made by France to provoke an intervention in Syria.  Most of these attempts turned around chemical weapons' use and how France tried to pin it on the regime despite the fact that there was no hard evidence the regime used chemical weapons.  Moreover, France blatanly ignored the use of chemical weapons in the spring 2013 by the rebels in the Aleppo area.  The authors come to the same conclusion as Seymour Hersh in his two investigative reports about the subject, published in the LRB, here and here.  They detail the implication of the Élysée in doctoring a report on chemical attacks in which the informants’ note, that a gaz leak could have resulted from a regime bombardement of a secret rebels’ chemical weapons laboratory, was simply redacted. 

But another interesting story is the alleged ‘investigation’ led by a journal close to the French government line on Syria, Le Monde, on chemical weapons’ use.  Starting in May 2013, le Monde published a series of articles on chemical weapons’ use by the Syrian regime in Ghouta.  Laurent Fabius, foreign minister under Hollande, thanked Le Monde for their 'help' in a June 5th appearance on French TV channel 2.  However, Chesnot and Malbrunot reveal that Le Monde journalists who took the samples from Syria, served only as ‘mules’ carrying samples given to them by the doctors of the ‘free Syrian Army’, collected from more than one site, sites that le Monde journalists weren’t able to verify.  Le Monde photographer and journalist took the samples and handed them to French intel agents across the border in Amman, where they were stationed after the closure of their embassy in Damascus.  The samples were then given to the French embassy in Amman who sent them directly to the only Paris laboratory capable of analyzing such samples, without the knowledge of the Quai d’Orsay.  The Quai was surprised to receive a letter from Le Monde editor-in-chief, Nathalie Nougayrède, asking when she could expect the results of the analysis.  Under such circumstances, The Quai had to publish the results, which converged with earlier reports made after sample collection by French intelligence.  The results of the French investigations pointed to discrete traces of sarin used on a small scale.  It is around this time, write the authors, that Paris and London, against all other western countries, were in a drive for an intervention war on Syria. The next chemical weapons attack of August 2013 was just few weeks away and it was going to be on a larger scale.

The 'New Roads to Damascus'

The book ends with a final chapter titled  ‘The new roads to Damascus’.  In it, the auhtors conclude that Paris, among all other countries, must have known well the difficulties related to regime change in Syria because of the strength of the regime.  The Syrian government, ever since an earlier bloody revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in the eighties, was ready for such a challenge.  The authors advise that western countries should have aimed for reform and not for regime change.  They anticipate the resumption of relations between western countries and the current regime in Damascus, and the need for security collaboration between Syria and the West to fight Islamist radicals.

The authors write that France acted with emotions and was not able to assess the reality of the uprising but rather wanted its wish for regime change to become a reality.  Not everyone saw things this way: as dissent inside the Quai d’Orsay grew on the irrealist stance France took on Syria, a personal envoy of Sarkozy was disptached to tell dissenters that one message was to be heard and followed: ‘Assad was going to fall.’  Where differences of opinions existed, they were muted.  

What emerges from the book is a relationship between France and Syria that became vassalized, subjected to other interests: the Gulf and the US.  Chirac saw Syria through the eyes of his friend Hariri and Saudi Arabia.  And Sarkozy departed from Chirac’s policy only to follow Qatar’s.  In both cases, the US, whose policies in the region have long been aligned with the Gulf's, won by rallying to its hardline on Syria, and in both cases, the formidable French diplomacy in the Levant not only became redundant, but was now working against its initial aims when it won a mandate on these countries after WWI; protecting Christian minorities.

Contrary to appearances, France didn’t lead during the Syrian crisis, it merely followed blindly, and against its own intelligence, experience and interests, policies made in the United States and the Gulf, serving as a frontline for these policies. The best proof of this is that one can look hard at a rationale, direction, and centre of decision for France's Syria policy, and yet find none.

Lebanon: A Tale of Two Governments and Two Visits (part III)

Part I and Part II

We divided our overnight stay in the north between a B&B in a small village high in the mountains surrounding the Qadisha (holy) valley and a hotel in Ehden.  The latter, perched at around 1800 meters above sea levels around the same valley, is the summer residence of former president Suleiman Frangie and current Marada movement leader MP Suleiman Frangie jr and an Aoun and Hezbollah political ally.  Opposite Frangie's den, and only few kilometers away, is Gea'gea's village Bsharre.  Samir Gea'gea' is the chief of the Lebanese Forces militia who fought in the civil war and is suspected of having played the main role in the slaying of the actual Marada movement leader's parents Tony Frangie, his wife and his daughter.  He was pardoned in 2005 by the new Lebanese parliament for other crimes and got out of prison to become an MP for Bsharre. Another Qadisha village, Diman, is also in the surroundings, is the summer residence of the Maronite Patriarchate.

The Qadisha valley is known for having contionuously hosted Maronite hermits and other Christian hermits since the 13th century, according to records, but probably before because there were hermits in the Maronite religion as soon as the 5th century.   Its mountains are interspersed with villages that reach for the sky.  Lebanon's mountainous regions have vibrant rural communities.  The Qadisha valley is at the heart of the Maronite religion history and yet, around it, the civil war has left the memory of dramatic events and deep divisions that run in the Maronite community until today.  There is a beautiful description with pictures of the valley on this blog.

During our stay we made frequent visits to my native village. 

On our first visit to my village, my cousin promised me that for every meal we eat with them he was going to accompany us on a tour of the land.  The land is outside the village and although I am acquainted with it, I couldn't remember its limits.  And for three consecutive days, we would arrive around 10 a.m. to the village, spend the morning visiting relatives, eat lunch with my cousin around 1 p.m. and head to the fields between 4 and 6 p.m.  

The village has expanded.  Nobody really leaves the village, even though they work outside, villagers keep houses in the village and so do their grown-up and married children.  Part of the agricultural land has been invaded by houses and I discovered the price went significantly up from what my father told us, partly because of housing expansion, partly because the dramatic increase in prices in Beirut is having a snowball effect on the rest of the country, and also because many wealthy Christians are fleeing Iraq and other Arab countries and settling in Lebanon, so much so that the Lebanese government had to set a limit on how much land and property a foreigner can buy. 

We visited the house where we were born my brothers and I.  It is uninhabitable right now, it has been empty for more than 20 years.  I arranged for an architect to visit and we are working right now on plans for renovations.  It was quite emotional to visit my parent's house.  There were some pictures and books covered in dust.  I rescued some of them.  I remember that at the start of the civil war my father, afraid that Christian Phalangist militia, who were executing their political enemies in the village, would find socialist litterature in our house, made me burn some books.  I remember my rage and my sadness but I also understood that my father was trying to protect us.  I promised myself that we would bring the house back to life.  Only thing left was to convince my brothers.

Outside our village visits, always warmly welcomed and eagerly expected, we toured the Qadisha valley, its mountains, villages, trails, fields and monasteries.  We also trekked the LMT in the area.  There  are beautiful Cedar reserves around Tannourine, Bsharre and Ehden, and we visited some of them.

One of the most beautiful monasteries is Saint Antoine of Qoshaya.  It hosts the first typographic printing machine of the ME on which the first Arabic bible was printed. 

We also went to the beach in the north.  One day we hired a fisherman boat to Rabbits' island near Mina, Tripoli (Lebanon's northern city).  The island has some insignificant ruins from the time of the crusaders and became a training ground for Palestinian factions before and during part of the civil war.  It is now a natural reserve.  

Tripoli is a very poor city and poor children were lining the Rachid Karame street begging drivers for money on red light stops.  It is also a recruiting ground for Hariri militia.  Another day on the beach was spent in Byblos. There was a big family reunion in Byblos.  My husband's niece, who was studying Arabic in Damascus, came for the day all the way from Damascus to see us. 

In the north, mostly Christian, very few were supporters of the western Saudi leaning March 14th movement led by Mr. Saad Hariri and his Christian ally Ge'gea'.  Despite the difficult situation in neighbouring Syria, and probably because of it, most Chritsians were apprehensive and wary of any western political influence and most Lebanese Christians in the north supported the Hezbollah-Aoun led coalition that was in the process of forming the next government.  Dennis Kucinich understood it better when, appearing on New TV (Lebanon) after a visit to Bashar El Assad in Damascus, one July morning, he said to the interviewer that after meeting El Assad for about three hours he was convinced that foreign intervention won't resolve tensions in Syria and that the best solution is dialogue.  The new Lebanese Patriarch, Al Ra'i, who took it upon himself to tour Maronite communities everywhere in Lebanon during this summer, visited my village on the day we left the country.  We saw the preparations and we were told that he will be met with orange scarves (orange is the color of the political movement of Hezbollah's Maronite ally Michel Aoun).  Al Ra'i got the message of the majority of Christians in Lebanon, they don't count on the West anymore.  It is no surpirse then to see his most recent statements about Syria and the necessary support for the resistance in Lebanon.

One thing is certain, Lebanese want to move forward, they don't want to make wars.  Past governments since Taef  applied neoliberal economic policies which saw Lebanese savings evaporate.  Lebanese used to be savers and not borrowers.  It isn't the case anymore.  The country is in a very difficult economic situation.  On our way to the airport, the taxi driver described to us how he lives.  He has a family of four.  He earns around 3000 dollars a month.  As real estate is high and exceeds budget he decided to live outside the city, but then gaz prices are high.  Good schools and good health are private.  By the end of the first week of every month, he has already spent most of his salary, mainly on reiumbursing borrowed money.  He goes to the bank, borrows again and waits for the next month.  Driving tourists is an additional income for him and he works as intermediary in real estate deals.  He told us that Lebanese don't possess their country anymore, they don't possess themselves.  He was hoping the new government would do something but was skeptical.  He was an angry man.  Most people who live on fixed income in Lebanon are like him.  

During our stay in Lebanon we watched on TV the debates in parliament around the confidence vote for the new Mikati government.  The debate was at times very acrimonious.  This is the first non-Hariri, non neoliberal, pro-people government since the 90s.  I had come to Lebanon in a first visit in Januray for my father's funerals with some anxiety over what might happen after the fall of the Hariri government and finished my second visit in July after a new government from a new coalition was formed.  Lebanon was in a post Hariri mood and it was hoping for some positive change.

The Special Tribunal For Lebanon: Justice For All Or Justice For The Cedar Niggers?

Days after the nth leak, the Special Tribunal For Lebanon (STL) announced his indictments on July 2nd accusing, what we now know at least since 2009, four members of Hezbollah. The announcement coincides with the new Lebanese government's statement of principle on the STL going for a confidence vote in the Lebanese parliament soon, and with the positive developments for Assad in Syria coming after an intense diplomatic and political activity in which the Syrian president met with representatives from the US and the UK, and in which the regime and the internal opposition seem to be willing to find a way out of the crisis.

Hezbollah reacted immediately yesterday with a speech from its leader Hassan Nasrallah aired on major Lebanese tv channels.

Nasrallah's speech after the indictment.

The STL has been biased and politcised from its inception and a tool against the Lebanese resistance. It is no coincidence that he first leaks pointing to a possible Hezbollah role in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri were published in the Figaro just after Israel's defeat in the 2006 war against the Lebanese resistance. This was an indication that the tribunal became very quickly a tool for the US and Israel to achieve against the Lebanese resistance what they were not able to achieve with the July 2006 war.

Nasrallah spoke of the flaws in the investigation at lenght and provided new disturbing material about the corruption, politicisation and the infiltration of the tribunal by Israel and the CIA. here are some points:

1. The lonely trail of the investigation or the mono rail.  While Brammertz, the second UNIIC chief prosecutor who came unde fire fromm March 14th, pursued more than one trail of investigation, the focus of the investigation of the first and third prosecutors (Mehlis and Bellemare) was alternatively on Syria and Hezbollah.  They never pursued the business trail and never considered seriously that Israel might have interest at throwing the country in civil war again.  This is despite the fact that Hezbollah provided evidence that Israelis were monitoring the site of the bomb that killed Hariri and his daily route days before and on the day of the assassination. The evidence was judged circumstancial and was not investigated.

2. The tight cooperation between Israel and the tribunal. Not only Israel was not investigated but the tribunal sought information from Israel. It also tranferred its computers and files through Israel when it moved its operations center from Lebanon to the Netherlands, instead of transferring them through Beyrouth airport. This last information was obtained thanks to Hezbollah intelligence and Al-Manar aired a picture of the Israeli customs authorisation as a proof. Israel has its footprints all over the tribunal up to its president, Antonio Cassese, 'a great friend of Israel'. Al Manar aired a video in which one of cassese colleagues was paraising him as a great friend of Israel at the 2010 annual Herzilya conference where Cassese was due to attend.

3. The role of foreign western intelligence agencies in the investigation, unsavoury characters. Hezbollah, once again, was able to gather information on some key individuals who worked for Daniel Bellemare, the chief prosecutor at the STL. There is Najib Nick Keldas, australian, ex CIA, had a role in the massacre of Bir El 'Abd (one has to be aware here that most western sources consider Imam Fadlallah, the target of the bomb that killed more than eighty, erroneously as the spiritual guide of Hezbollah, which is not true, Fadlallah was the spiritual guide of the Shia community in Lebanon). Than there is Robert Baer, the much talkative ex-CIA, who was a special agent assigned to track Mughniyyeh and failed to kill him. Mughniyyeh was a high ranking Hezbollah operative who was later killed in Damascus. Baer also had a role in Bir El Abd Massacre. Then there is Michael Taylor, who worked for Scotland Yard on Islamist terror. Dorede Bcherraoui (Lebanese living in France), who had a role in the false witnesses who previously misled the tribunal to accuse Syria and the four Lebanese generals. And finally, Darrel Mandir, who continues to work for the CIA.

4. The corruption of prominent members of the tribunal. As in the case of the Israeli customs document, Nasrallah's speech was interrupted with a video showing Gerhard Lehman, deputy to ex chief prosecutor of the UNIIC, a UN commission for the assassination of Hariri on which premises the STL was created, taking bribes for solding files, infos and documents produced by the UNIIC. It is known in Lebanon that some of this material was sold to local TV stations. The STL is also famously known for its leaks, many of which were sold to the media. This was a damning moment for which the March 14 parliamentary minority in lebanon who were behind the creation of the STL had nothing else to say to the media after the video was aired other than the video only showed that Lehman was being bribed but it did not show who was bribing him! Then there was the false witnesses testimonies. It was very damaging to the UNIIC and made the STL irrelevant. It was the first scandal to be widely known by the Lebanese public. It is since this scandal and ensuing video aired by New TV showing Saad Hariri, the son of the murdered, discussing one the false witnesses testimonies in the presence of Gerhard Lehman that Lebanese started to look at the STL with great suspicion. But this did not affect the current chief prosecutor of the tribunal, not only he did not investigate the false witnesses but he also prevented personally the tribunal form prosecuting one of them, Zuhair Siddique.

5. The non confidentiality of the investigation and the politicisation of the tribunal. Every leak in the press concerning the indictments, and there were many, were timed to influence local politics. There were leaks by members of the tribunal for money, there were leaks by March 14th in order to attack Hezbollah and other Lebanese parties who are not members of their coalition, and there were leaks by the STL, the last of them being the release, days before the official indictment, of the complete names of the accused. The last leaks and the indictment were timed to hinder the confidence vote in parliament for the new Mikati government which put March 14th, for the first time since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, out of the government and in the opposition.  Initially, March 14th thought that the Miakti government will not reach a consensus on how to deal with the tribunal, but when the consensus was reached and the new government was heading for a confidence vote, the accused names appeared in full and the indictment was issued promptly days after the leak. Where is justice? There were leaks in 2009 before the elections, and then during the formation of Saad Hariri's government where Hezbollah were asking to be officially recognised as the national resistance. There were leaks when Saad Hariri's government fell. All these leaks served politically one party in Lebanon, March 14.

This is a very one sided, politicised tribunal controlled by Israel and the US and aimed at one party in Lebanon, the resistance. The tribunal is presided by Antonio Cassese, 'a great friend of Israel' who consider the resistance as terrorists. How justice can be done with such a tribunal?

The Israelis now are saying that Lebanon is in the eye of the tempest. That's their hope and the hopes of some in March 14th that Sunnis will fight Shias, that by accusing a Shia group, Hezbollah, of the assassination of a Sunni prime minister, Lebanon will descend into civil strife. But there will be no such a strife. Lebanese want to live in peace. They have more urgent priorities, the economy that was neglected by the former corrupt government, jobs, electricity, basic needs. The Siniora and the Saad Hariri governments are obsessed by Hezbollah and put this obsession first as their government priority at the expense of more urgent priorities. Hariri could not even tolerate alternance in Lebanon, he sees himself as PM for life.

Hezbollah does not recognise the legitimacy of the STL and will not let this corrputed and politicised government arrest his accused members. March 14th should not ask the current government to deliver the accused to the STL, they could not ask from the Mikati government what they cannot ask from themselves. Saad Hariri signed a document recognising the special status of Hezbollah as the national resistance. Even a pure March 14th government could not comply with the STL's demands. The Mikati government should be given the chance to work for all Lebanese and Lebanon, and Lebanese should be protected from civil strife. The STL is just a stage in the war waged at the Lebanese resistance and at the Arab resistance in general since 1948. When the Lebanese resistance was created in 1982, it was small and without allies. Today the resistance is strong. Lebanese should not worry.

Indeed, the reactions to the STL indictments were only seen among March 14. Lebanese are busy fighting a difficult economic situation and the STL has been discredited in their eyes a long time ago. There was no surprise when the indictments were announced. Lebanon's debt is equivalent to Greek debt, a debt created by Hariri father and son, and Siniora who is a member of their Future movement, who ruled the country while enriching themselves. This is while the cost of the STL payed for by the Lebanese government is projected to be around the 200 millions and counting, millions that serve as a tool in a war waged by the enemies of Lebanon.

The STL is a farce. If it were to operate in the same way in any other country it will be judged differently under different judicial standards. It will be scrutinised. So why the UN and USrael want this kind of justice for us? Who do they think we are? Cedar niggers perhaps.


"Pffft" went the UN special tribunal for Lebanon

Friday Lunch Club summarising the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

March 14 to the US, Gulf states: Help us regain power in Lebanon through the STL (this link as well as links to screen shots in this post were produced by FLC)

UPDATE: More proof of the transfer of the tribunal documents through Israel.

UPDATE: Omar Nashabe (Al Akhbar) speaking on the STL at the LSE in Januray 2011.
UPDATE: Robert Parry: Troubled History of the Hariri probe

Flash update: follow the latest developments about the Hariri tribunal (STL) on my twitter account.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The tribunal of discord

The killers of Lebanon, its economy and its population, before, during and after the civil war, were never brought to justice. They were freed and pardoned and elected to parliament in the name of national concord and unity.

From the beginning, the STL was a political instrument and an instrument of discord, because it accepted 'doing justice' to one man, while forgetting the many victims of those who are claiming justice for this man.

If Saad Hariri wants unity and peace for Lebanon, so he must shut disavow the tribunal. If the international community wants justice for Lebanon, so it must bring total justice, not partial and misguided justice.

Lebanon's 'unity' government falls.

Shut down this tribunal!

''Those Who Are Conspiring Against Lebanon And The Resistance Will Fail''

From The Daily Star, Lebanon.

According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, members of Hezbollah will be accused by the Hariri special tribunal, so says Saad Hariri who conveyed the news to Nasrallah. This is the latest attempt by this tribunal to play dirty political games in Lebanon to the benefit of Israel and Saudi Arabia against Hezbollah. March 14 are trying to achieve in Lebanon what Israel failed to achieve in 2006, kill Hezbollah and the resistance. But they lost their credibility long ago. However, what they will succeed in achieving is agitating sectarian tensions...

Nasrallah said he had information that such an indictment had been decided upon before 2008, but its announcement was being postponed to await more suitable political circumstances.

He expressed surprise that the decision to indict had been made even before the STL had summoned some Hizbullah members for questioning in April.
“Our indicators are that the indictment will be announced in September or October, given what is being prepared in Palestine and the region,” he said.

He said the charges targeted the resistance, after the failure of previous attempts to achieve the same goal. Lebanon will be pushed into a sensitive period given that the indictment will be issued soon, added Nasrallah.

...But Nasrallah rejected the indictment, stressing that his party was not afraid at all.
“Let them issue the indictment, those who are conspiring against Lebanon and the resistance, and whose projects have failed are the worried parties because their projects will fail again,” Nasrallah said.
...Tackling the STL’s expected move to absolve Syria of the crime, Nasrallah called upon March 14 officials who had accused Syria of the assassination to reconsider their positions and to engage in a “real” self-critique, “because the results of their decisions had consequences on all the Lebanese.”
He touched on the stances of March 14 coalition following the killing of Hariri, saying they had instigated sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

Lebanon, Base For Jihad

From Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2008

Click on the picture to read.About the author, Vicken Cheterian

Al-Qaida roots itself in Lebanon, Thanks to Hariri's sectarian politics

From Le Monde Diplomatique, February Edition.
Excerpts from the article.
In addition to this article there are two others we can read on the subject of Al-Qaida in Lebanon:
Seymour Hersh: The Redirection
Nir Rosen: Al-Qaida in Lebanon, the Iraq war spreads.
And
A digest on the subject of Al-Qaida and the future movement published on this blog, May 2007.

RADICAL ISLAMISTS EXPLOIT A FRAGMENTED COUNTRY

Last year the Lebanese army besieged the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared, where a previously unknown organisation, Fatah al-Islam, was dug in. These events, like attacks on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, reflect the appearance of radical Sunni Islamist networks, some of them linked to al-Qaida, which is now treating Lebanon as a key base .
by Fidaa Itani

"We were forcibly thrust into a battle that does not concern us. I would rather not have had to fight the Lebanese army," said Shahin Shahin, a Fatah al-Islam military commander, to a negotiator during the siege of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared by the Lebanese army. It was not then yet known that he was a son of Osama bin Laden and a high-ranking al-Qaida official. His misgivings about the fighting reflected his organisation's ambivalence towards Lebanon -- whether to see the country as a battleground on which to confront the United States and its allies, or just as a rear base for the training and transit of al-Qaida operatives...
...In those days the Sunnis were middle class traders, shopkeepers and civil servants, or illiterate country people. They expressed their support for Arab nationalism and the Palestinian struggle by joining Nasserite or leftwing movements. However, several Sunni groups moved closer to radical Islamism after Syrian troops occupied Lebanon in 1976, bringing repression with them. At the same time the influence of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood started to increase, threatening the regime in Damascus with armed incursions by its military wing.
When the civil war in Lebanon ended in 1989, with the signature of the Taif accord, the Salafists, whose influence was still only limited, mainly targeted other Islamic organisations, al-Ahbash (1) or the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects (AICP). These attacks were an opportunity for the Salafist groups to perfect their intellectual and missionary skills, recruiting in many towns and villages.
They were particularly successful with middle-class graduates, as well as with students of theology who had been in Saudi Arabia and stayed in contact with radical ulema there. But the groups still lacked cohesion, the best known being al-Hidayah wal-Ihsan (Preaching and Charity), which was reorganised by the son of the movement's founder, Dai al-Islam al-Shahal.
On 31 August 1995 one of these groups assassinated Sheikh Nizar al-Halabi, the head of the AICP, and caused a stir. It was the first time that a Salafist group had eliminated an opponent. Members of the organisation confessed to committing the murder and persisted in taking exclusive responsibility to the end. However, the Lebanese authorities and Syrian intelligence (which controlled the country) chose to pin the crime on Abdul Karim al-Saadi (aka Abu Mahjen), the Palestinian leader of Asbat al-Ansar, which was based in the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, near Saida in southern Lebanon. In 1999 the same group, originally formed by veterans from the war in Afghanistan, was blamed for the assassination of four judges in Saida central court.
...In May 2000 Russian negotiators, who were supervising the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon with the Syrians, gave the Lebanese and Syrian authorities a recording of a conversation between Kanj and Chechen mujahideen, which led to a Lebanese army raid on Dinniyeh on New Year's Eve 2001. At the same time the Syrian authorities, operating on the other side of the border, arrested radical Islamists, confirming the network's trans- national nature.
Al-Qaida waited till the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 before openly calling for units to be set up in Lebanon. But al-Qaida also operates as a form of franchise, with a far from centralised organisation, leaving considerable freedom of movement to local units. It was well established by the end of 2005 when the Lebanese authorities first succeeded in catching the members of a network, subsequently referred to as the "Network of 13", led by Hassan Nabaa, a Lebanese national. The group, which also comprised Saudis, Syrians and Palestinians, supported al-Qaida and the Iraqi resistance movement, operating in Lebanon and Syria where it clashed on several occasions with the secret service, particularly in
border zones. It is said to have shot down a Syrian helicopter.

The arrests prompted a controversy because the prisoners'confessions contained details of their involvement in the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, on 14 February 2005. But there is doubt about how the confessions were obtained, and the group's alleged link with the young Palestinian Ahmad Abu Adas, who claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on Hariri in an earlier video recording (2).
...The war of 2006
In July 2006 the 33-day war between Israel and Hizbullah erupted. The jihadist groups took advantage of the confusion to extend their influence. They also made use of the decision by the Islamic state in Iraq (instituted by al-Qaida) to expel any elements lacking specialist military skills or unable to blend in with the local population. Fatah al-Islam attracted many of these lost soldiers, prompting a hostile
response by Fatah and other groups belonging to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which wanted to "cleanse" the Ain al Hilweh camp. The Lebanese army, which had just deployed in force to the south of Litani following the end of the fighting between Hizbullah and Israel, was worried about leaving these jihadists only a short distance from the 12,000 strong UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil). Fatah al-Islam decided to take refuge in the north, an area with a Sunni majority, considered friendly.
Several meetings paved the way for this move, not only with the local Salafists but also with members of parliament belonging to Saad Hariri's Future Movement, concerned about Hizbullah's growing influence. Al-Absi held talks with a Sunni MP from Tripoli, a doctor who once had leftwing sympathies and who expressed his fear that the Shia Hizbullah might turn on the Sunni (3). Al-Absi replied that, without entering into conflict with a force fighting Israel, he would not allow anyone to harm the Sunni.
...At the end of 2006 Ahmad Tuwaijiri, a senior Saudi al-Qaida member, arrived in Lebanon. He met Fatah al-Islam leaders several times, as well as other Salafist groups. Funding flowed in, with public and private donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait offered by prosperous businessmen who want to help the jihad.

The various Salafist organisations (4) were also keen to regroup, the better to resist the Shia threat. The political crisis in Lebanon and occasional clashes between Sunni and Shia, and between supporters of the parliamentary majority and opposition, created a favourable context (see "Why there is deadlock").
The local members of al-Qaida took advantage of the Future Movement's pressing need for militia to counterbalance Hizbullah. Although it appreciated the risks involved in dealing with fundamentalist factions, Hariri's party nevertheless adopted this short-term expedient in its struggle with Hizbullah, Syria and Iran. Al-Qaida acted pragmatically, seizing the opportunity to raise funds to recruit dozens of additional combatants, organise more training sessions at Ain al-Hilweh, prepare plans for attacking Unifil in the south, and spy on the embassies of western and Gulf countries in Beirut.

In June, a month after the fighting started, the Lebanese security forces discovered that Shahin was Saad bin Laden. He had managed to enter the camp a few days after the start of the battle and became popular with the combatants. The security forces had noticed his arrival in Lebanon a few months earlier. Saad, one of the most active leaders in the operations section of al-Qaida, had set up cells and support units all over Lebanon, in collaboration with al-Qaddur.

...Too high a price

However, as the political crisis in Lebanon grinds on, prompting all the factions to arm and train their combatants, al-Qaida may be able to lurk in the shadow of the largest Sunni group, the Future Movement, which is hiring combatants under the cover of private security companies. Hariri's organisation has so far assembled about 2,400 militia and plans to recruit 14,000 more in northern Lebanon alone. But the siege of Nahr al-Bared convinced part of Lebanon's Sunni elite that an alliance with al-Qaida came at too high a price.

...Will local groups claiming allegiance to al-Qaida agree to steer clear of Lebanese affairs? Whatever the answer, al-Qaida's future in Lebanon looks secure.
________________________________________________________ Fidaa Itani is a Beirut-based journalist
Translated by Harry Forster

The General Of The Dead Army

Hezbollah says they have in their possession body parts of Israeli soldiers dead during the July 2006 agression on Lebanon and abandoned on the battlefield by the Israeli army. (Reuters 19.01.08. 22h30 by Yara Bayoumy,)

I read this yesterday and asked myself what is the point of Israeli soldiers' body parts thrown in the middle of a speech on 'Achoura day ? 'Achoura for the Shias designates the tenth day of the first month of the Muslim year during which the community commemorates the killing on year 680, at the orders of the Umayyad Caliph, of Imam Husayn, son of Imam Ali, and grand'son of the prophet. It is a day of atonement, remembrance and mourning.

"O zionists, your army has been lying to you. Parts of your dead soldiers' bodies were left behind in our fields and in our orchards", Nasrallah declared to a crowd of hundred thousands gathered for the commemoration of 'Achoura.
"Our moudjahidins are used to fight these zionists, to kill them and to keep whatever left of their bodies (...) I am telling Israelis, We have your soldiers heads, we have their hands, we have their legs", added Nasrallah, who was speaking on a rare appearance. He has not been seen in a public appearance since months.

The 34 days of the Israeli agression on Lebanon left Israel with 157 deaths, most of them soldiers, while there were more than 1200 victims on the Lebanese side, mostly civilians.
"We even possess an entire body, we also have half bodies or more, from the head to the chest", insisited the head of Hezbollah.

Israel condemned the speech as a disregard for elementary humanitarian principles and even the religious principles of Islam. Some in Israel were of the opinion to ignore the speech as not to give importance to Nasrallah. Some analysts believe that Nasrallah's speech is meant to pressure Israel into releasing Lebanese prisoners in exchange of the two Israeli soldiers detained by Hezbollah and whose kidnapping officially started the 34 days Israeli agression on Lebanon. Twice this month, Israel detained temporarily for interrogation, from Lebanese territory, two Lebanese shepherds. Israel continues also to violate Lebanon's airspace almost daily.

"We believe that Israeli attacks against civilians on the border are humiliations for the lebanese nation and its people. We cannot stay silent in the face of these attacks and we must confront them one day, if God's willing." Threatened Nasrallah.

The head of Hezbollah doubted the capacity of the political and military leadership of Israel to launch another war on Lebanon. But he added that if this were to happen, "We promise them a war that will change the destiny of the region."

Despite the fact that it was delivered to a civil audience, and on a religious occasion, Nasrallah's speech is 100% military speech, destined in the first place to Israel's implicit Lebanese allies, Sanyura, Hariri, and March 14th. Everybody knows that an army that respects itself doesn't leave bodies of soldiers behind or, if it leaves them, it tries to have them back by time of peace either through negotiations or through war. Israel has been ignoring this fact and doing neither, probably becuse it neither wants negotiations nor another defeat.

The theme of dead soldiers' bodies and armies' honor has inspired poets and novelists. One of the most interesting novels on the subject was written by Albanian author Ismail Kadare, "The General Of The Dead Army".

Twenty years after World War II, an Italian general, armed with maps, measurements, and dental records, and accompanied by a priest, is sent to Albania to recover the remains of his country’s fallen soldiers. In addition to the brutal weather, they have to be wary of the hostility of the Albanians working for them. This may be an errand of mercy for the general, but the chance to humiliate their one-time conquerors offers the Albanians a welcome vengeance. But there is an escalation, at a wedding, the Italian general must answer for the crimes of his country and all countries that have invaded this 'land of eagles', seeking to destroy its people.

Beside the fact that Nasrallah is emulating Imam Ali's speeches, this speech is clearly a challenge for Israel to revisit the battlefield where it was defeated because an army that leaves its soldiers behind is an army without honor. Some may think that Nasrallah has gone mad. Why provoke Israel ? To receive the same reply as in July 2006? But we are now in 2008, and, through Israel and its defeat in 2006, Nasrallah is sending a signal to his opponents in Lebanon who are refusing any compromise. We know that Sanyura and March 14th were hoping for a swift Israeli victory over Hezbollah in 2006. Nasrallah is now taunting them. He is showing them how not even Israel wants to visit its battlefield with Hezbollah once again.

Lebanon is going through its worst political crisis since the 1975-1990 civil war, and negotiations between the Hezbollah led oppostion and the government on a consensus presidential candidate are stalling to the point many are evoking the risk of a new civil war. Nasrallah has stated on many occasions that Hezbollah will never use its military power against other Lebanese, as he has never done so in the past, an act from which Hezbollah takes pride and popularity. Nasrallah was conciliatory to a maximum with the government and March 14th who are showing no will to talk to his powerful alliance, betting on the inability of Hezbollah to engage in internal warfare and risk losing its popularity. And so Nasrallah is sending a signal to the Sanyura government telling them that Hezbollah can engage at any time in hostilities against Israel, recreating the kind of consensus around him that emerged spontaneously during the Israeli agression on Lebanon. This might be Sanyura's and March 14th's worst nightmare. They would rather prefer a civil war in which they receive US and Israeli support to terminate Hezbollah. But Nasrallah is fully aware of this and aware that this is exactly what is behind the stalling of the negotiations on the future president while the country is without a president since the end of August. So if one party is determined not to engage in a civil war when it had many chances to do so during the last two years, there won't be a civil war, despite the many efforts made by Saudi paid Sunni extremists, renegades from the Iraqi insurgency, to throw chaos in Lebanon leading to a new civil war.

Then the only way this is going to end is, most probably, and if Hezbollah has the means, by a new war with Israel. And don't expect Israel to listen to Sanyura or any other anti-Hezbollah politician in Lebanon, but it will do so only when feels the time is right. Now, fresh from ist defeat, the time isn't right for Israel to launch another war on Lebanon. Hence, Nasrallah,s taunting of Israel about its dead soldiers left behind. Recently, the web has been buzzing with reports from military strategists reflecting on the Israeli debacle against Hezbollah in July 2006 and on future prospects.

And so it seems that Nasrallah's mention of Israel's dead soldiers held by Hezbollah is just a reminder to the lousy politicians in Lebanon that an agreement is unescapable.

UPDATE ON february 16th: Sanyura warns Hezbollah that an open war against israel is bad for Arabs and Muslims.
Le Hezbollah affirme détenir des "restes" de soldats israéliens.

Lebanon's Partial Parliamentary Elections: The Metn's Christians Say 'NO' to March 14th

Amin Gemayel was so afraid of loosing these elections that he adressed a request to the minister of interior asking him to post a public notice about the different titles the voters might add to his name when voting, in order not to invalidate the vote. The interior ministry complied, and it was contrary to the Lebanese electoral law.

Mr. Gemayel listed on the public notice his different titles, former deputy, former president of Lebanon, sheikh, and how might the voter designates him on the ballot according to these titles:

His excellency the president Amin Al-Gemayel;
His excellency the president sheikh Amin Al-Gemayel;
The president Amin Al-Gemayel;
The president sheikh Amin Al-Gemayel;
The sheikh Amin Al-Gemayel;
Amin Pierre Al-Gemayel;
Amin Al-Gemayel.

But that did not prevent him from loosing the battle for a doctor*, Camille Mansour Khoury, who is quite new to Politics, who is not former president, and who is not a former sheikh. And there are more titles Camille Khoury doesn't have and which Gemayel has; former warlord, former Syrian collaborator, former Israeli collaborator, and an ally to the Sunni-Saudi dominated March 14th's government.

Aoun is accused by March 14th of being pro-Syrian because he is against them. It is only since 2005 that March 14th like to describe themselves as anti-Syrian and everybody else as pro-Syrian. "You are either with us or against us". Some other critics of Michel Aoun have also pointed to the fact that his alliance with Hezbollah, an Islamist party, was going to loose him votes. However, there is a reality on the ground felt by Christians every day. The Gemayel and Lebanese Forces alliance with Hariri is diminishing the role of Christians in Lebanese Politics. Christians in the March 14th movement are not even playing second fiddle to Hariri. They have lost the support of their community for blatant corruption, special interest politics, and political incoherence. In a country used to freqent shifting in political alliances, they beacme the champions of the process to the point they are unable to make their moves intelligible for the community; allied to syrians one day and then to their ennemies the day after. However these leaders are acting like their fathers, grand'fathers, and grand grand'fathers, as if the people of Lebanon were going to vote along sectarian lines for the Zaim (local leader of the community), without accountability. And so Hariri, in his alliance with them, has been thinking the same, that by buying the Zaims he is buying the popular vote. But it didn't work that way for him since 2005. The emergence of general Michel Aoun, a former Syrian foe when everybody else was allied with the Syrians, and his party, The Free patriotic Movement, after Aoun's return from his exile in France after the Syrian withdrawal, has changed the political landscape in the christian community and beyond. The Hariri-Merch 14th coalition first tried to discredit him by depiciting him as a fool and a marginal of Politics but his popular support among Christians stayed unchanged. They then tried to strirr up the sectarian divide when they realised that this was not working enough for the March 14th coalition. But the more they try to push the people of Lebanon along this line and the more they discredit themselves in part of the population, the disappointed of 15 years of civil war, of two years of sectarian agitation since Hariri father died, and of the slow economic and social decline of the country that has emerged in Lebanon under the Hariris.

Christian leaders are only a screen for Hariris who, with the help of Saudi Arabia, continue implementing a one family rule (the Hariri family) of Lebanon marked by a shift from interreligious balance to affirming a Sunni-Saudi inspired and monitored takeover of the country, its economy, and its future. March 14th Christians are not even heard on decisions taken by the Hariri backed government and concerning their community in the first place;
The financing of Sunni extremism in Lebanon (for which many proofs have been given during the recent clashes between the Lebanese army and an extremist group in Nahr El-Bared);
The supression of the good Friday as a national holiday;
The signing by the Sanyura Hariri backed government of the Islamic chart for children's rights;
Many decisions disregarding the Christian community, the Hariri and Saudi backed Sanyura government has been taking, couldn't have been taken without the servility of March 14th Christian allies, and in total disregard for Lebanese political traditions in interreligious dialogue and balance of power between the different religious communities (in times of peace of course because when there is no dialogue they fight). Christian representatives allied to Hariri, like the Gemayels, Chamouns, Eddés, and Gea'gea, having lost the popular support, are just happy to be supported themselves by the all powerul Hariri and his money while sticking to the same sectarian politic of their ancestors.

The other reality is that the alliance between Michel Aoun's Christians and Hezbollah is different from the one between Christians and Hariri in March 14th. In the alliance between Aoun and Hezbollah, Christians are playing a major role and will continue playing this role on decisions concerning the fragile politico-religious equilibrium in Lebanon and the oecumenic character of the country. And because Hezbollah needs them in order not to appear as a southern only, shia only, political party, their influence extends to the way Hezbollah has practised and may continue to practice governance and power sharing in Lebanon. In addition to the fact that in the presence of a strong Christian party as an ally, Hezbollah, as Sheikh Nasrallah has expressed it in many occasions, will never govern Lebanon as an Islamic country, unless it is the will of all Lebanese. And as long as the voice of the Christian community will be heard, there will not be an Islamic republic in Lebanon. The other option being a secular Lebanon but under present circumstances in the Midlle east this option appears as an utopia.
On the other hand, as there is no written agreement between Hariri and his Christian allies on governance, Hariri feels he has free hands to do whatever he likes in all aspects of Lebanese life. The Saudi born and educated Hariri is islamising the country by small decrees under total silence from his Christian allies.

There is rhetoric and there is reality. Lebanese Christians may be sensitive to the rhetoric of March 14th and their propaganda. However, most of them, having lived through the civil war, are still more sensitive to reality because it allows them to sense danger and threats on their future in their country. The reality of the Christian community now in Lebanon is about the insecurity they feel for the place they might occupy in the Lebanese political chess game in the future. Changes for this future are hovering around. Who will choose the next Lebanese president, Hariri and Saudi Arabia or the people of Lebanon ? What will be the prerogatives of the new president to be elected in September in order to counter the monolithic Sunni ruled government and the all powerful Hariri and his holding that is sucking the blood of Lebanon, Solidere ?

No matter how much Aoun's political adversaries will try to pin on him the image of a Syrian collaborator - because of his alliance with Hezbollah - a man chosen by Syria and Iran, the reality is different. Because this same man had fought savagely the Syrian occupation while others like Gemayel and the Lebanese Forces have accepted unscrupulously the external American diktat of the time on collaborating with the Syrians. And no matter how much the March 14th will portray Hezbollah as an Islamist party, March 14th are the ones who are fighting sunni extremists who have gotten out of their control and of their pockets...

We can say many negative things on Lebanese and Lebanon's Politics but there is one thing the civil war taught Lebanese as communities: to evaluate danger on their survival. Hariri father and son have been transforming Lebanon and have achieved what a fierce civil war for survival and power sharing between religious communities had not achieved; putting Lebanon under the influence of one community while disregarding the others. The Mansourieh, Metn, Christians, and with them the whole Christian community who have been doing a soul search as of late, do no trust the Hariri coalition for their own future and the future of a multireligious Lebanon, the only viable option for Lebanese Christians.

"That General Aoun’s candidate, a virtual political unknown, proved a tough competitor to Mr. Gemayel, the onetime president who curried sympathy and campaigned in his son’s memory, underscored the level of discontent many Christians here have been feeling and the resonance of General Aoun’s message.

The general, in alliance with Hezbollah, has led the revolt against Lebanon’s political system, demanding greater inclusion and an end to control by a series of political dynasties."

Read this excellent analysis of the meaning of Gemayel's defeat by Joshua Landis at Syria Comment.

Angry Arab: Why I am worried about the safety of Armenians in Lebanon.

Angry Arab on Walid Jumblatt's Racism against Lebanese Christian Armenians

Mustapha Mond at Ms Levantine: Going Ugly early.

Angry Arab on Gemayel's reaction

*The results of the election are being contested by Gemayel as of Monday 1. a.m. local. This indicates that the tallies are in favour of Khouri. But even though Gemayel might be declared winner, given all his former titles and the fact that he led his campaign to replace the seat of his slain son, his 'victory' would only reflect the political loss Mr. Gemayel is incurring within his own community because of his alliance with Hariri.

P.S: The other partial election was in Beyrouth and the only challenger to the Hariri candidate was a secular communist. hezbollah boycotted the elections because they were not called by the president of the republic but by the March 14th government in disregard for the constitution. The participation was 18.9 % and the results are 22988 votes for the Hariri candidate and only 3556 for his communist rival.

An old story made new: Israel's role in the Entebbe hijacking and in 9/11

Reading Angry Arab today I found a link to this article.
It has been seen as a daring raid by crack Israeli troops to rescue dozens of their countrymen held at the mercy of hijackers.
But newly released documents contain a claim that the 1976 rescue of hostages, kidnapped on an Air France flight and held in Entebbe in Uganda, was not all it seemed.
A UK government file on the crisis, released from the National Archives, contains a claim that Israel itself was behind the hijacking.
An unnamed contact told a British diplomat in Paris that the Israeli Secret Service, the Shin Bet, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) collaborated to seize the plane.

Israel's role in 9/11 has also been questioned but I guess, as in the Entebbe case, we will never find out exactly what happened, only few forgotten documents revealed now and then with no will to connect them or to investigate.

Recently we were watching 'The Last King of Scotland' a movie about Ugandan president Idi Amin Dada in which one gets to see a scene from the Entebbe hijacking and highly mediatised Israeli rescue operation. My husband remebered the coverage of the event at the time and reminded me that one of the main factors in the success of the operation was that it was Israel who helped build the airport at Entebbe, so they knew the configuration very well.

Well, no wonder why Israel is miserably failing when attacking Lebanon becuase this is the only military operation they haven't been able to rehearse and stage as they want. And no wonder why Israel is so miserably failing militarily except when it comes to attacking Palestinian and Lebanese civilians because their might rests on dirty operations performed by their secret service and not on their courage in the battlefield.

In years from now we will maybe get to know that 9/11 wasn't exactly as we were told but it will be too late. And who cares ? Because, after all, we already know that the current fighting in northern Lebanon isn't exactly what the Sanyura government is telling Lebanese and the world. We already know that the Sunni extremist militia the sanyura/Hariri government is fighting is a Hariri tool, and nobody cares. Not even the UN who is busy setting a special tribunal for the assassination of a rich and corrupt man who brought his country to the edge of civil war again and whose son is continuing the destructive mission with the help of the US/UK/France and the UN, and nobody cares...The other lesson one might extract from this story and from the actual news in the Occupied Palestinian territories is that the worst ennemies of the Palestinian people since the Naqba have been the Palestinian people themselves and that the worst tyranny is the tyranny exerted from the inside...Palestinians and Lebanese should meditate this...

Is the Hariri family financing Al Qaida and are the neocons profiting from the operation?

Enough of the Hariris, their Saudi mentors, and their neocon 'friends'. Since Rafiq Hariri died, Lebanon is on the brink of civil war again. The political heir, Saad Hariri, has been, like his father, pressuring the international community into accomplishing his political goals in Lebanon, at the expenses of the stability of the country. With his wealth, his closeness to the Saudi reigning family and, by extension, with the world class neocons including the newly elected French president Nicolas Sarkozy and his foreign affairs minister Bernard Kouchner (a doctor who supported the Iraq war), and his friendship with Chirac, former French president, Hariri has been pulling all the strings in order to establish a permanent vassalization of Lebanon to the west with himself as the self appointed viceroy. My husband calls him Harmani. When we visited Lebanon in 2005 it was after a victorious parliamentary election for Hariri won in the wave of indignation about his father's assassination. He was on all posters, sometimes under his father's picture (Lebanon is the only country where dead people can campaign in elections), sometimes standing with a smile, a well trimmed beard, a hand in his pocket (which we all know is anything but empty) and a cellphone in another hand. My husband asked who was on the poster and I told him. We laughed when he confided that he thought that this might have been an ad for Armani. Since then we call him Harmani. But now is not the time to laugh. Now is the time to cry. Lebanon is on the brink of civil war again, thanks, among other things, to this little corrupt rich brat and his overambitious father.
Now is also the time for some less narrower perspective from what we read in the press on what is going on in lebanon now. And as always these perspectives cannot be found easily in the mainstream press, especially when it comes to matters related to the middle east.

Alain Gresh writes on his blog:

More than one party can be interested in taking profit from the actual instability in Lebanon. Syria, without doubt. But also the actual Lebanese government trying to force the international community into adopting an authoritarian UN security council resolution imposing on Lebanon an international tribunal on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, despite a clear hostility to this kind of tribunal from the Lebanese opposition. The actual Israeli government as well as the US also have interest in destabilising Lebanon. However, contrary to what is generally written in the press, what is hapenning in lebanon now is not a confrontation between the Lebanese people with the backing of the international community, and Syria and its « agents ». There is a multilayered confrontation in Lebanon. One of these layers is the division of the country between two distinct political camps with equal importance. On one side we have the Sanyura government backed by Hariri and the Sunnis, the Lebanese forces and half the Christian community, and the Druzes. On the other side we have the Shias with the Amal and Hezbollah movements, as well as the Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun with half the Christian community. Is France making a good choice by taking sides in this conflict ? Bernard Kouchner, Sarkozy's foreign minister, and notable French neocon, is today in Beyrouth to support the Lebanese people and the Sanyura government while it is the Palestinian people who are being bombed. For what ? For a bank robbery that turned ugly ? Or for what to come in Lebanon ?

Bien des gens ont intérêt à l’instabilité au Liban. Le gouvernement syrien sans doute, mais aussi la majorité libanaise actuelle (qui cherche à pousser la communauté internationale à une résolution autoritaire pour créer un tribunal international sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri), le gouvernement israélien, les Etats-Unis, etc. Mais, contrairement à ce qui s’écrit généralement, ce qui se passe dans ce pays n’est pas un affrontement entre, d’un côté, le peuple libanais allié à la communauté internationale et de l’autre la Syrie avec ses « agents ». Se superposent plusieurs affrontements, dont le premier divise le Liban lui-même en deux camps d’à peu près égale importance. En privilégiant l’un des deux, la France fait-elle le bon choix ?

Nidal, at Loubnan Ya Loubnan, has an interesting perspective. Nidal's perspective shows the ideological and practical links between the different parties interested in Lebanon's descent into chaos. One can fairly say that these parties are organised in a loose network of interests in which the main puppeteers of the unfolding tragedy are the Hariri family closely linked to the Saudis, and by extension to the neocons. Nidal shows also how the Hariri family is financing Muslim Sunni extremists in Lebanon and worse, their migrations into Lebanon. One can fairly assume that we have here a paradigm for both the mobility and the survival of global sunni jihad relying entirely on local respectable sources of money totally immune to scrutiny and close to the neocons.

Nidal starts with an article written today by the Lebanese and Hariri paid journalist Michael Young in which Young tries to refute Seymour Hersh's assertions of March 2007 about the financing and the support provided by Hariri and the Lebanese government to Sunni extremist groups in Lebanon in order to counter the influence of Hezbollah. In his article, Young explains that if the Hariri family did in fact paid for a bail out of prison for members of Jund-Al-Sham, who later joined Fatah El-Islam already implemented in Nahr El-Bared in Northern Lebanon, it was to buy peace in the south. However, this assertion, claims Nidal, which Lebanese consider as normal political dealings, has the potential to open to us a window on how the Hariri family does Politics in Lebanon.

What is interesting about Jund Al-Sham is that this organisation, who is on the Russian list of terrorist organisations but not on the US list, has claimed responsibility for the Hariri assassination but this was discarded by the Mehlis commission who operated entirely under the mentorship of Hariri. Jund Al-Sham has nonetheless claimed responsibility for three of the fourteen carbombs investigated by the Mehlis commission. Jund Al-Sham has also claimed responsibility for the 2006 bombing fo the US embassy in Damascus and for the killing of a Hezbollah member in 2004. Moreover, two of its members who infiltrated the Ain El Hilweh camp in south Lebanon, were arrested by the Lebanese army in June 2006 for the murder of two members of the Islamic Jihad in south Lebanon. One of them confessed working for the Mossad. The army seized at his house documents proving that some members of this extremist organisation have actually trained in Israel. Hussein Khattab, brother to prominent sheikh Jamal Khattab suspected of organising recruitement fro Al Qaida Iraq, was also arrested in June 2006 by the Lebanese army on the charge of directing a spy netwrok for Irsael in palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon. There was very little information in the news about this incident.

Knowing all this, how the Hariri family, as Michael Young claims, could have given money to members of Jund El-Sham ? Michael Young seems to considerthis as a gaffe. I think we should consider this as a serious financing for extremists groups with the goal of destabilising Lebanon opening wide the doors for foreign intervention as in Iraq. It is more than time to hold this family, who claims to have reconstructed Lebanon and who is now pushing the whole country into civil war and destruction, accountable.

One of the many links between Fatah El-Islam, Fatah organisation in Palestinian camps, and the Hariri family, the last two being the actual and semi-official allies of the US administration in its 'war on terror'.

And between assassinations, denials and justifications the march 14th movement and the Hariri clan are confirming in a way their ties to Sunni extremist groups related to Al Qaida. Here is two more:
Ahmad Fatfat, minister of sports and interior minister by interim during the Israeli agression on Lebanon.
Bahiyya Hariri, sister of Rafiq and aunt of Saad (the chief of the actual parliamentary majority in Lebanon and major fund provider) deputy member of the Lebanese parliament.
Assassination of Abu Jandal by Lebanese Security Forces (special army of Sanyura and Hariri.

Fatah El-Islam's alleged bank robbery: nothing more than a scheduled visit gone awry at the cashier to collect the regular amount send by Hariri. They discovered that the payments were stopped and helped themselves.


A very important and remaining question is how the lebanese army, which is under the authority of the president (who is opposed to the Hariri family), was drawn into this fight ? The answer is here. This answer also explains why the Hezbollah is supporting the army. Hassan Nasrallah will be speaking to Lebanese on Friday evening to explain his party's position. Stay tuned.

Now, the US in all that ? As Always in the Frontline when it comes to fighting Al Qaida.

Please read these short notes from prominent blogger Angry Arab, with links:

Lebanese government asks the US for 280 millions in military aid to fight 200 members of Fatah El-Islam.

Six US cargo flights with ammunitions are scheduled to land in Lebanon over the next two days.

US assistant secretary of state David Welsh met with Lebanese army chief last week.

Interview

There is a wealth of information in this interview on Nahr El-Bared's conflict of Angry Arab blogger As'ad Abu Khalil by Ali Abunimah from Electronic Intifada.